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 Executive summary 
The debate on globalisation has led to an increased political interest in the 
effect foreign takeovers may have on national industrial development, 
employment and innovation. The FOTON project aims at answering the 
following question: 
Are there any major differences between nationally owned companies 
and local firms taken over by foreign multinationals as regards 
capabilities for innovation and the interaction with other firms and 
institutions? 
Hence the point is not to give an answer to the question of whether foreign 
acquisitions are good or bad for a country in general, but to what extent they 
influence learning and innovation in the relevant companies and the national 
economy as a whole. However, given the importance innovation has for 
economic growth and welfare development, our study should provide 
important input to the wider discussion as well. 
FOTON has carried out the following studies: 
• A statistical study based on data from the Community Innovation Survey 
and other sources 
• Ten case studies of takeovers in the Nordic countries 
• A survey of discussions and policies related to the issue of foreign direct 
investments 
 
The main conclusion is that we find no clear differences between domestic 
companies and affiliates of foreign multinationals as regards innovation 
activities. Hence foreign companies are not more likely to be innovative 
than domestic companies.  
However, domestic multinationals outperform foreign owned firms in terms 
of R&D investments in Finland and Sweden. In Norway domestic 
multinationals and Anglo-Saxon multinationals have significantly higher 
R&D intensity than other firms. 
It seems that domestic multinationals are the main beneficiaries of public 
R&D support. Moreover, the domestic multinationals are also more closely 
embedded in the national innovation system compared to foreign 
multinationals, meaning that they are more likely to interact with other firms 
and institutions. This is important, as insufficient involvement in this area 
weakens the competence flow from the foreign-owned companies to the rest 
of the economy. 
The FOTON team will argue that we see no clear behavioural patterns that 
justify discrimination positively or negatively against foreign owners.   
Foreign-owned companies take part in international networks that might 
benefit other firms in the national innovation system. They may also bring  
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in capital that can be used for innovation. This calls for a policy that aims at 
attracting foreign investments. 
Given that the framework conditions are favourable to foreign investments 
in the Nordic countries, we would argue that the best option for attracting 
more foreign owners would be to market these countries as innovation 
friendly and knowledge intensive countries. Thus the activities of the 
national “Invest in” institutions should be strengthened.  
The Nordic Council of Ministers should consider establishing a new Nordic 
web portal, leading potential investors to relevant information and potential 
contacts. 
Public opinion is probably not a strong impediment to foreign investments 
in the Nordic countries. The governments should nevertheless consider 
measures aimed at strengthening public understanding of the effects of such 
investments. 
In general the Nordic level of corporate taxes is not excessively high. In 
countries where the corporate tax level is considered high, governments may 
consider adjustments. However, it could also be that foreign investors 
believe that Nordic tax levels are higher than they actually are. If that is the 
case, an active information campaign could be of help. 
Foreign investors will normally look for the same favourable framework 
conditions as domestic companies. An enterprise friendly innovation policy 
will also encourage foreigners to invest these countries. Governments 
should, for instance, establish stable and transparent regulatory 
environments, encourage international activities in local knowledge 
institutions, and include languages and foreign culture in relevant curricula.  
Furthermore, foreign companies should be encouraged to take part in 
publicly funded R&D and innovation projects. 
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FOTON  Globalisation and innovation 
Main findings and policy recommendations 
By Per Koch and Siri Aanstad, NIFU STEP1 
Globalisation and innovation 
One of the most important economic trends in the late 20th and early 21st 
century is the strong tendency towards increasing globalisation in trade. 
Cross-border trade is increasing due to free trade agreements and free trade 
areas. For small countries like Sweden, Iceland, Denmark, Finland and 
Norway this is very important, as these are small economies that are 
depending on international trade for their livelihood.  
Internationalisation leads to harder competition. Companies that succeed 
globally are normally those that are able to keep up with the technological 
development, or – even better – those that are able to stay in front, 
developing new and improved products, processes and services.  
This is why we see such a strong interest for innovation among policy 
makers. They know that their economies – and hence the economic 
foundation for any welfare policy –   _depend on the innovative capabilities 
of their companies. Hence it becomes a very important political objective to 
develop framework conditions and policy instruments that strengthen the 
development of innovative and profitable companies. After all, these are the 
companies that generate wealth and new employment opportunities. 
The systemic approach 
Innovation policies in the Nordic countries are all influenced by the so-
called systemic approach to innovation. According to this view 
technological advancement and competence building is characterized by 
constant interplay and mutual learning between different types of 
knowledge and actors, including firms, institutes, universities, sources of 
financing, relevant public agencies, and more.  
Accordingly, a national innovation system (NIS) is normally understood as 
the system of firms, knowledge institutions and other institutions that 
influence the innovative capabilities of firms. The premise is that the 
competences developed in one part of the system, may – directly or 
indirectly – influence the learning process in the firms that are part of that 
system by way of collaboration, the acquisition of goods and services, and 
other forms of knowledge and technology diffusion. 
According to this way of thinking public authorities may encourage 
innovation by strengthening industrial learning and by developing efficient 
networks for the distribution of knowledge and personnel. The general 
                                                 
1 This part of the report is based on all three FOTON reports. For litterature lists, see the various chapters 
of the three reports. 
- 3 - 
Main findings and policy recommendations  FOTON 
framework conditions for innovation, including taxation, physical 
infrastructure, laws and regulations must also be taken into consideration.  
However, politicians answer to their local electorate and most such policies 
are restricted to the national arena. Research on innovation and innovation 
policy is normally also limited to the national innovation system, i.e. the 
network of companies, institutions and regulations that shape the national 
economies.  
This means that the globalisation phenomenon often falls outside their 
reach, including the development of multinational companies in general and 
foreign takeovers in particular. 
It is important to keep in mind that according to the systemic view of 
innovation, which also underpins the FOTON reports, the company is the 
main arena for industrial innovation.  
It is certainly true that many companies make use of universities and 
research institutions in their innovation efforts, but much innovation grow 
out of in-house activities. This does not mean that universities and research 
institutes are unimportant. Far from it: They often contribute indirectly 
through the production of new candidates, new knowledge and new 
methods. However, most commercial inventions are born in companies, 
which mean that modern innovation policies become increasingly more 
company centred as opposed to science centred. 
This also means that company ownership may become an important factor. 
If ownership influences the innovative capabilities of firms and – 
consequently – the competence development in the national innovation 
system as a whole, policy makers must address the question of foreign 
takeovers. 
Mergers and acquisitions 
If a financial transaction leads to one party getting a controlling interest in 
another firm – i.e. more than 50 percent of the voting power – we count that 
as a takeover or acquisition.  
A merger, on the other hand, is understood as a merger of equals – i.e. when 
two firms voluntarily and with relatively equal strength join within a 
common structure and under a common name. 
Foreign takeovers: Good or bad? 
The policy debate on foreign direct investment (FDI) is normally dominated 
by two scenarios. 
The positive scenario looks upon FDI as a beneficial phenomenon. First of 
all FDI brings in money that can be invested in innovation. Secondly, local 
branches of foreign companies may bring in new competences, directly 
through the people who are working there, and indirectly by the fact that 
they have access to the knowledge base of the whole multinational 
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company. Through trade and cooperation with local companies, this activity 
will strengthen the national economy and the national innovation system. 
Countries like Ireland have made it an important national objective to attract 
such investments, mainly in order to achieve the effects mentioned above. 
Admittedly, such policies have focused on attracting greenfield investments, 
i.e. the establishment of completely new operations on national soil, but 
they often also cover takeovers, i.e. foreign multinationals buying local 
companies. The argument is that takeovers are good for the national 
economy, again because they bring in fresh capital, the development of new 
competences and access to global networks. 
According to the alternative negative scenario, foreign acquisitions may 
equally well have a negative effect on the knowledge base of a nation. The 
reasons for this may vary.  
One argument is that multinationals may buy local companies in order to get 
access to their physical as well as human resources. As soon as a company 
has been acquired, these resources may be moved to the multinational’s 
home country. The worst case scenario is that the local branch is closed 
down altogether. 2 
Another argument is that foreign companies may implement company 
policies that undermine the innovative capabilities of the local branch. 
Hence the need to keep company secrets may stop the local affiliate from 
interacting with other companies and knowledge institutions in the way it 
used to. This means that even if the local unit gets access to the knowledge 
base of the large multinational, it is not able to diffuse this knowledge into 
the national innovation system, and it will find it harder to interact with 
national partners.  
The foreigners may also implement a system of governance that is alien to 
the local culture or that in other ways hinders innovation, creativity and 
collaboration. 
Research questions 
The main objective of FOTON is to find out how foreign takeovers in the 
Nordic countries influence the innovative capabilities of the acquired 
companies and of the innovation systems that surround them. Hence we 
would like to answer the following question: 
Are there any major differences between nationally owned companies 
and local firms taken over by foreign multinationals as regards 
innovative capabilities, research and development, and interaction with 
other firms and institutions in the local innovation system? 
                                                 
2 In a comment on the effects of international ownership on the Norwegian economy, Senior Officer 
(førsteamanuensis) at the Norwegian School of Management BI, Erik W. Jakobsen, says that we must 
take seriously the threat that foreign ownership may imply an outflow of strategic and competence 
intensive activities from Norway to the headquarters of transnational corporations. Newspaper article in 
Dagsavisen, published 07.05.02  
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If the answer is yes and it is the case that companies taken over by foreign 
multinationals are less likely to innovate and interact with the national 
innovation system, that might signify a need for a policy that (a) protects 
local companies from foreign takeovers or (b) a policy that encourages 
foreign multinationals to invest in local innovation and networking. 
Alternatively, if the answer is that companies taken over by foreign 
multinationals are more likely to innovate and interact with the national 
innovation system, that might signify a need for a policy that encourages 
foreign multinationals to invest in local companies. 
On the other hand, if the answer is no, there are no significant differences 
between companies taken over by foreigners and nationally-owned 
companies, one could argue that there is no need for a specific innovation 
policy in this area. 
Please note that the FOTON team has focused on the effect foreign 
takeovers have on the innovative capabilities of firms and innovation 
systems. We have not focused on other possible positive or negative effects 
of such takeovers.  
Hence we have not studied whether companies taken over by foreign 
companies in general are more likely to be closed down than companies 
taken over by local national companies, nor have we looked at any 
differences in the employment rate.  
The statistical study 
Our statistical study is based on data from the Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS), a questionnaire sent to companies all over Europe. Our 
statistical experts, led by Bernd Ebersberger and Hans Lööf, have made use 
of a large sample of over 5000 firm level observations in the five Nordic 
countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.3 
However, even given our access to these statistics, it is not easy to find 
definite answers to the question given above.  
For instance: There exist no separate data on the innovative capabilities of 
firms that have been taken over by foreigners. However, most foreign-
owned companies in the Nordic countries are the result of takeovers. 
Because of this we have chosen to use foreign ownership in general as a 
proxy for foreign takeovers, thus making it possible to answer the following 
question: 
Do foreign owned firms perform better or worse innovation-wise 
compared to domestic firms? 
                                                 
3 For a more detailed presentation and references, see FOTON Report No. 3: Bernd Ebersberger and Hans 
Lööf: Corporate Innovation Activities, Does Ownership Matter? 
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There is another methodological problem: There is no way we can find out 
what would have happened if acquired companies had not been taken over.4   
To give one example: If a company is closed down a few years after it has 
been acquired by a foreign multinational, this can be a result of the takeover. 
However, it could equally well be that the local company would have died 
anyway, due to e.g. market conditions. 
If one reads the raw data – i.e. the data from the CIS survey as they are – the 
conclusion must be that companies taken over by foreigners are superior 
innovators. Compared to domestic firms, foreign-owned firms in the Nordic 
area are distinguished by having 
1. a larger proportion of innovative firms;  
2. a higher R&D intensity; 
3. a higher level of innovation sales per employee;  
4. a larger proportion of firms applying for patents;  
5. a larger proportion of firms possessing patents;  
6. a larger proportion of firms conducting R&D on a regular basis; 
7. a higher export intensity;  
8. a stronger focus on global markets;  
9. more human capital in terms of well educated people as a share of 
total employment;  
10. a higher level of labour productivity; and  
11. a stronger dependence on sources of knowledge for innovation from 
other enterprises within the group. 
 
However: firms taken over by foreigners are likely to be more innovative 
than domestic firms, because that is exactly the kind of firms foreigners are 
most interested in buying. They want to acquire R&D intensive firms in 
order to get access to their knowledge base and technologies. 
Hence we cannot take these “facts” at face value, because the two groups of 
companies (foreign-owned vs. domestic) are not directly comparable. 
Because of this we have used various statistical techniques in order to 
increase comparability. Thus the study takes into account that differences in 
firm performance can be explained by factors such as firm size, business 
sector, human capital, physical capital, market orientation and more.  
The FOTON researchers have also made adjustments based on the fact that 
innovative firms constitute a particular group of companies. So, even if the 
total sample is exploited, the main focus is on innovative firms. 
Finally, we have decided to go beyond the foreign/domestic dichotomy, in 
order to capture other dimensions of the topic at hand. As a result the study 
covers the following company types: 
                                                 
4 See for instance Geoffrey Jones: The Evolution of International Business, NY 1996. 
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Table 1 Types or groups of firms included in the statistical study 
Domestic firms (DOM) Foreign-owned firms (FOR) 
Domestic uninational firms (DU) 
Domestic companies that are not part 
of a multinational group 
 
Nordic multinationals (NM) 
Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian 
and Swedish owned companies (with the 
exception of local companies when 
analysing individual countries) 
Domestic multinational firms (DM) 
Domestic companies being part of a 
domestically owned multinational 
group 
Anglo-Saxon multinationals (ASM) 
UK-owned, US-owned, Irish, Canadian 
and South African corporate groups 
 European and other multinationals 
(EOM) 
Rest-category dominated by European 
countries 
 
The control group is the domestic uninational firms. 
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Table 2 Corporate ownership and gap in engagement in innovation 
activities  
Gap The importance of corporate ownership 
 Den Fin Ice Nor Swe 
     The likelihood to carry out 
innovation projects.    -DM 
 
 
 
-DM +DM  +DM +DM Investment in R&D and other 
innovation activities per employee    -NM 
+ASM 
 
 
The probability of receiving public 
R&D support 
 +DM 
-NM 
 
-EOM 
 +DM +DM 
+DM +DM  +DM +DM The embeddedness in the 
domestic innovation system.   +NM 
 
 
   
+DM +DM  +DM +DM The embeddedness in vertical 
innovation system.  +NM 
 
 
   
The embeddedness in the 
horizontal innovation system. 
 +DM   
 
 
 
+DM 
+DM +DM  +DM +DM 
     
+ASM 
The embeddedness in the scientific 
innovation system. 
    +EOM 
+DM +DM  +DM +DM 
+NM +NM  +NM +NM 
The utilization of knowledge for 
innovation from other enterprises 
within the group 
+ASM   +ASM +ASM 
    +EOM +EOM 
The control group is uninational firms. 
 + (-) indicates significant association at the 1% or 5% level of significance.  
DM is domestic multinationals, NM Nordic multinationals, ASM Anglo-Saxon 
multinationals and EOM is European and other multinational.  
 
Results, the input side 
When adjusted for factors like firm size, sector, human capital etc. we get 
the following results (cp table 2). Note the important role of domestic, as 
opposed to foreign, multinationals. 
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Propensity to carry out innovation 
For the Nordic region as a whole, we find that there are no differences 
between domestic and foreign-owned firms as regards the propensity to 
carry out innovation. Hence foreign companies are no more likely to be 
innovative than domestic companies. 
Nor do we find any clear differences when we look at the individual 
countries, with the exception of Norway, where domestic multinationals – 
i.e. Norwegian companies with units in other countries – are less innovative 
than other firms.  
R&D expenditures 
In general multinational firms invest more in R&D than uninational firms 
(i.e. firms with no units abroad). 
The evidence is compelling that domestic multinationals outperform foreign 
owned firms in terms of R&D investments in Finland and Sweden, 
everything else being equal.  
In Norway domestic multinationals and Anglo-Saxon multinationals have 
significantly higher R&D intensity than the control group of domestic 
uninationals, as well as Nordic multinationals and European and other 
multinationals. 
Note that we have adjusted for the fact that foreign multinationals are more 
likely to be large and therefore more R&D intensive companies. One 
possible conclusion is therefore that the fact that a company is multinational 
– that is, that it controls assets in more than one country - makes it more 
likely to invest much in research and development.  
Public R&D support 
In general it seems that domestic multinationals are the main beneficiaries of 
public R&D support in most of the Nordic countries.  
Among the firms that can be classified as innovative (i.e. that bring out new 
or improved products, processes or services) we find that domestic 
multinationals are much more likely to receive public R&D funding than the 
other groups in Finland, Norway and Sweden.  
For Denmark and Iceland we find no significant differences between the 
five groups of firms. 
It should not come as a surprise that multinationals are able to get access to 
public funding. These are often the kind of firms that make use of R&D to 
stay competitive on the world market. Being large firms they also find it 
easier to set aside resources for R&D projects and R&D collaboration, and 
the public agencies are more likely to trust their ability to carry out such 
research.  
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It is interesting to see the strong position of domestic multinationals – as 
opposed to foreign companies. The relatively weak position of the foreign 
companies does not have regulatory causes. Local branches of foreign 
multinationals have access to public R&D funding in the Nordic countries, 
as long as the local unit is registered as a company in the relevant country.  
It could be that the foreign multinationals do not feel the same need for 
public funding as the domestic multinationals. If this is the case, this may 
not cause major problems for local units acquired by foreign firms. 
However, the national innovation system as a whole may suffer. If these 
units get less involved in publicly supported collaboration projects, there 
may be less interaction between them and other companies and knowledge 
institutions, weakening the diffusion of technology and competences. 
It could also be that foreign-owned companies have not been able to build 
long term relationships with the civil servants in the public agencies, 
making it less likely that they ask for support and less likely that they get it. 
However, given that most of the foreign-owned companies have been taken 
over, this cannot be the main explanation, at least not if these national 
affiliates have a long history in the relevant Nordic country.  
Another possible explanation can be that other institutions and companies 
loose interest in the acquired firm after the takeover, believing that the 
foreign owner will reduce R&D activities or that the owner will no longer 
be interested in collaborative projects or that. Some FOTON respondents 
have indicated that this might be the case. If the public servants get the same 
impression, these companies are less likely to be involved. 
Embeddedness in the national innovation system  
The fact that domestic multinationals are more successful as regards public 
R&D support rhymes with the fact that they are more integrated in the 
national innovation system than any other type of investigated firms.  
The only group of firms that have the same presence as the domestic 
multinationals is Nordic-owned multinationals in the Finish innovation 
system. 
We have divided the national innovation systems into three parts, in order to 
find out what kind of institutions the various company types are most likely 
to interact with. 
As regards vertical integration – i.e. interaction with customers and 
suppliers in the same value chain – we find the same pattern as for 
embeddedness in the innovation system in general: Domestic multinationals 
are significantly more involved in vertical innovation collaboration than 
other firms. Again Finland presents a variation of this theme, as Finish and 
Nordic multinationals are most closely integrated along this dimension. 
If we look at horizontal cooperation – i.e. collaboration with firms within 
the same industry (including competitors) – we find that domestic 
multinationals are much more likely to engage in such cooperation than 
other groups.In Denmark, Norway and Iceland we find no difference. 
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In Denmark, Finland and Norway domestic multinationals are also more 
likely to cooperate with the science system, i.e. universities and research 
institutes. In Sweden the domestic multinationals share this position with 
Anglo-Saxon multinationals and European and other multinationals.  
We have not been able to subdivide foreign companies into different groups 
as regards Iceland. However, the pattern is the same as for Sweden: xxxx 
Domestic and foreign owned companies show the same tendency to 
cooperate with the science system. 
Not surprisingly we find that other enterprises within the same company 
group play an important role as knowledge sources in domestic as well as 
foreign owned multinationals. This is most evident in the case of Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
Results, the output side 
We have found that domestic multinationals play a dominating role as 
regards innovation activities and collaboration in the Nordic countries. The 
only exception is Iceland, where we see no clear pattern. 
One likely conclusion is that being a multinational helps when it comes to 
innovation and collaboration with other parts of the innovation system. 
However, the fact that the company has its headquarters in the relevant 
country is equally important. Companies with a long local history are more 
likely to be deeply embedded in the national innovation system. 
However, we must also look at performance indicators. A high innovation 
activity level should lead to higher output. As it turns out, we are unable to 
find a robust pattern confirming the superiority of domestic multinationals 
as regards output indicators. 
In Denmark and Norway foreign firms seem to outperform domestic firms. 
We find no systematic differences in Iceland and Sweden, while Finish 
multinationals deliver a better innovation performance than other firms 
located in Finland. 
One possible explanation for this is that domestic multinationals are using 
their home country for developing a technological capacity that is ultimately 
exploited by affiliates abroad. Correspondingly, the innovation and 
productivity performance of foreign owned multinationals can partly be 
caused by innovation activity carried out in their home countries. 
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Table 3 Corporate ownership and gap in innovation and economic 
performance 
Gap The importance of corporate ownership 
Den Fin Ice Nor Swe 
 +DM   +DM 
+NM   +NM  
The probability to patent. 
+ASM   +ASM 
 
+ASM 
+DM 
 
+ASM 
+DM 
+NM 
  +DM 
 
 
Radical innovations 
    +EOM 
The return on innovation 
investments (innovation sales) 
 
 
+ASM 
+DM 
 
  +DM 
+NM 
 
     The Economic performance 
(Labour productivity)    +NM 
 
 
Notes:  Uninational firms are the reference group.  
 + (-) indicate significant association at the 1% or 5% level of significance 
DM is domestic multinationals, NM Nordic multinationals, ASM, Anglo-Saxon 
multinationals and EOM is European and other multinational.  
Patent applications 
Patents are by no means an unambiguous measure for innovation output. In 
many industries inventions are protected by other means, and companies 
may innovate without patenting. That being said, patents do give an 
indication of innovation awareness and the ability to develop new products 
and processes. 
In both Denmark and Norway Nordic multinationals (i.e. foreign companies 
owned by Nordic neighbours) and Anglo-Saxon firms are more likely to 
apply for patents than other firms. 
In Finland domestic multinationals have a higher propensity to apply for 
patents than other firms. It should be noted that this is not due to Nokia, as 
we have adjusted for company size. 
In Sweden domestic multinationals and Anglo-Saxon multinationals are 
more likely to patent inventions. 
Radical innovation 
When we talk about innovation we normally mean products and processes 
that are new to the firm. What we are looking for is the companies’ ability 
to change behaviour and do things in a different way, so that they are able to 
compete in a changing market. You do not necessarily have to do things 
radically differently in order to succeed.  
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For the economy as a whole, however, it helps to have companies that are 
able to bring out radical innovations – i.e. innovations that are not only new 
to the company, but also new to the market. 
It is interesting to note that we have not been able to pinpoint any significant 
differences between foreign-owned and domestically-owned companies as 
regards the ability to bring forth radical innovations in Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland and Sweden. 
In Denmark no differences in this respect can be found between domestic 
multinationals and Anglo-Saxon enterprises. In Finland domestic and 
Nordic multinationals have the same propensity to introduce innovations 
new to the market, while in Sweden domestic multinationals and the 
“European and other” category seem to be most radical. 
Domestic multinationals, however, exceed the domestic uninationals in their 
ability to launch products that are new to the markets in Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden. Norway is the odd man out as neither the domestically-owned 
multinationals nor the foreign-owned companies show a better performance 
in launching radical innovations. Hence foreign ownership matters in 
different ways in different countries.  
Innovation sales 
There are definitely other incentives out there, but companies investing in 
innovation hope that this activity shall help them make a profit. Innovation 
sales are a gross measure on the return on innovation investments. 
In our study we find no clear pattern as regards such returns. In Norway and 
Iceland we can actually detect no robust differences. 
Anglo-Saxon firms seem to have the highest level of innovation sales in 
Denmark, while the domestic multinationals are the best performers in 
Finland. In Sweden Nordic multinationals seems to be superior to other 
firms. 
Labour productivity 
Existing research suggests that foreign owned firms generally have a higher 
productivity than domestic firms.  
When we look at the Nordic countries as a group, however, we find no 
differences in productivity between foreign and domestic firms. There is one 
exception, Norway, where foreign-owned firms do indeed outperform 
domestic companies. 
Reasons for takeovers  
Companies may have various motives for taking over another firm. And 
companies may also have different reasons for actually wanting to be taken 
over. 
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Among the reasons pointed to in current research are:5 
• the need for complementary products and a broadening of the 
product line; 
• the need for competent owners/affiliates; 
• the need for financially strong owners/affiliates;  
• the wish to reach a critical mass (in order to invest in innovation, 
develop markets etc., i.e. economies of scale); 
• the need for access to competence and innovation networks and 
clusters; 
• access to global or local markets and distribution channels; 
• access to a favourable regulatory environments (including tax 
systems); 
• the need to monitor new technological development; 
• the ability to generate entirely new technologies and products; 
• the wish to acquire strong brands; 
• the wish to increase shareholder value; 
• the wish to eliminate a competitor; 
• obtaining legitimacy for the organisation; 
• using the takeover as a tool for introducing structural change in the 
organisation; and 
• to get returns on investments (by selling stock). 
 
In order to deepen our understanding of takeover processes, the FOTON 
teams carried out ten case studies of selected companies in the 
pharmaceutical and ICT industries. A selection of ten case studies is in no 
way representative for Nordic takeovers in general. They do, however, offer 
some insight into how such processes can take place in a Nordic context. 
                                                 
5 See Hans de Geer, Tommy Borglund and Magnus Frostenson: “Impacts of foreign takeovers – some 
findings from litterature” in FOTON report No. 2; Sverre Herstad: “Theoretical perspectives on MNE 
organisation, strategy and subsidiary implications” in FOTON report No. 2;  Bernd Ebersberger and Hans 
Lööf in “Brief review of the litterature” in FOTON report No. 3; Juha Oksanen and Nina Rilla: “Case 
Findings – Overview” in FOTON Report No. 2. 
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Table 4 Companies studied by FOTON6  
Country Acquired Acquirer Sector Takeover year 
DK DAK-Laboratoriet Nycomed, Norway 
Amersham, UK, 
A group of investors  
pharma 1991 
1997 
1999 
DK Datacentralen CSC, US ICT 1996 
FIN Iobox Terra Mobile S.A of 
Teléfonica Group, 
Spain 
ICT 2000 
FIN Oy Star Ab Santen Ltd., Japan pharma 1997 
IS Computer Knowledge 
Inc 
Eastman Kodak, US ICT 2000 
IS deCODE genetics, Inc7 An Icelandic company 
with sites in the US 
pharma 1996 (founded) 
NO Nycomed/Axis 
Diagnostics 
Axis Shield Plc, UK pharma 1999 
NO Zoomit Kelkoo, France ICT 2000 
SE Astra Zeneca, UK pharma 1999 
SE Internet AB8 Deutchnet GmbH, 
Germany 
ICT 1999 
 
Among these companies we find that one very important reason motivating 
the acquired firms was the size of the Nordic markets. The national 
economies are small, and the financial resources available for expansion and 
growth are rather restricted.  
The takeover of Norwegian Nycomed Diagnostics by the UK-based Axis 
Shield Plc could serve as an illustration. The company respondents doubted 
that they would have been able to find the risk capital needed for their 
radical product renewal in Norway. By merging with Axis Shield they got 
access to the London capital market. 
The pharmaceutical Astra’s decision to merge with British Zeneca was 
partly caused by the large investments needed to launch new pharmaceutical 
products on the world market. Many of the respondents noted that the 
acquired companies wanted to take part in international business, and 
becoming part of a larger conglomeration made that easier. 
The Danish case company, Datacentralen, provides another reason for 
takeovers. The Danish government wanted to increase competition within 
the domestic IT sector by privatizing a publicly owned company.  
One important reason for the sale of the Danish pharmaceutical company 
DAK-Laboratoriet was that the owner, the Danish Pharmaceutical 
Association, wanted to abandon its sensitive double role as a producer and 
retailer of pharmaceuticals in Denmark. 
                                                 
6 FOTON Report No. 2, Juha Oksaned & Nina Rilla (eds.): Impacts of Foreign Takeovers in the Nordic 
Countries – what do the company case studies tell us?, Oslo 2005 
7 deCODE genetics Inc has not been a target of a takeover, but is a multinational company which has 
itself acquired companies both in Iceland in the United States. 
8 The names of the Swedish software case company and the acquiring German company have been 
changed – or anonymized – by the FOTON team. 
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In our cases the acquiring multinationals seem to be motivated by the search 
for growth and new markets. US-based CSC had, for instance, a very weak 
presence in the Nordic countries before they acquired Datacentralen. 
Japanese Santen Ltd bought the ophthalmic unit of Leiras Oy in order to get 
access to the European markets. 
 
The foreign multinationals were also looking for new products, platforms or 
production lines complementary to their own.  
Consequences of takeovers 
It is interesting to note that in general the acquisitions studied in the FOTON 
project must be considered successful, in that the local units continue to 
thrive after the takeover. All the pharmaceutical companies have achieved a 
more central position in the market after the takeover. The units have access 
to more resources and the number of employees has in some instances 
increased. 
There are two possible exceptions to this rule: The selected Finish and 
Swedish ICT companies were closed down some time after the takeover.  
However, even here the ownership transfers cannot be considered totally 
negative. The previous owners made fortunes because of the sales, the staff 
got valuable international experience and some of them established new 
companies. Moreover, the two companies would probably not have 
survived, even if they had not been taken over. 
The interaction between the mother company and the new affiliate varies a 
lot. Many affiliates have achieved an autonomous status within the 
multinational company. However, a general trend among “the FOTON 
companies” is an increasing demand for reporting on business performance. 
In general requirements made by the new owners have led to an upgrading 
of local business and innovation practices. 
One should keep in mind, however, that any final judgments as regards the 
success or failure of a these takeovers require more in depth investigation. 
There is also the time perspective to consider. A takeover may seem a 
failure one year after the acquisition, but a success three years later – or visa 
versa.  
Moreover, previous research presents a large number of failed takeovers, 
where the acquiring companies are unable to make use of the competences 
of their new employees, where new management practices kill local 
initiative, where local learning networks dissolve, in short: Where 
opportunities are lost. 
In some cases too much energy cay be devoted to integrating technologies 
and harmonising activities, in other cases too little is done to merge cultures. 
The transfer process and reorganisation may be traumatic for employees, 
dampening their creativity. On the other hand, a merger may lead to much 
needed reform and be liberating for local intrapreneurs.  
But then again, this is the case in any merger or acquisition, domestic as 
well as international. This is an important point, as it raises the questions 
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whether there really is a need for a “foreign takeover” policy, or if policy 
makers rather should focus on the effects of mergers and acquisitions in 
general. 
That being said international acquisitions pose special problems and 
opportunities, especially as regards culture and attitudes. Several of our 
respondents point out the difference in management styles between the 
Nordic unit and the mother company. Nordic workers may also interact in a 
different way than their American or Japanese colleagues, which may lead 
to conflicts and misunderstandings. Unless the foreign company is located 
in an English speaking country, there may also be a language barrier to 
overcome. 
Ot the other hand: Cross-cultural collaboration is very often a stimulating 
and prejudice-bashing experience that may give birth to much creativity and 
innovation.  
Another concern is that local innovation capabilities may be weakened due 
to the practice of transfer pricing in multinational companies. Transfer 
pricing refers to the strategic setting of prices for intra firm trade, which is 
to facilitate the concentration of profits in subsidiaries located in countries 
with favourable tax regimes. Thus, given the assumed high levels of 
company taxation in the Nordic countries, foreign takeovers may result in 
local firms being drained of financial resources. This may reduce their 
ability to invest in innovation enhancing activities which in turn may have a 
detrimental effect on the innovation capabilities of other local actors. 
There is no available statistics that makes it possible to answer this question 
on an aggregate level. The FOTON teams did ask their case study 
respondents about this phenomenon, but found no evidence of this taking 
place to any large degree. However, due to the limited number of case 
studies, we can not draw any general conclusions based on these companies.  
The heterogeneity of companies 
If we are to sum up, the main lesson from the studies presented above must 
be that it is hard to make general comments about the effects foreign-owned 
companies have on the innovation system, or – rather – that there are no 
significant and systematic differences between foreign-owned companies 
and domestically-owned companies as regards innovation output, and only 
small differences as regards input and integration in the national innovation 
systems. 
This should probably come as no surprise, as the group of foreign 
companies is very heterogeneous indeed, and as such individual companies 
will behave differently, also when it comes to innovation and research.  
This heterogeneity can also be seen on an aggregate level, which is why we 
have divided the group of foreign companies into “Nordic”, “Anglo-Saxon” 
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and “Other”. As pointed out by FOTON researcher Sverre Herstad,9 there is 
a correlation between traditions of corporate governance and innovation 
practices. 
One such dichotomy can be found between insider and outsider systems of 
ownership.  
In the Continental European and Japanese traditions owners regularly have 
an insider position in the firm, meaning that they have first-hand 
information about what is going on and that they get more closely involved 
in the long term strategies of the company. Because of this these companies 
may find it easier to make long-term investments in R&D and innovation. 
The Anglo-Saxon companies are more often characterised by highly 
fragmented and stock-exchange driven systems of corporate control. This 
system is dominated by smaller, non-committed investors, focused on short 
term company reports. Innovation is considered equally important, but the 
boards tend to focus on radical innovations that impress stock markets. In 
general these companies become focused on generic financial indicators as 
measures of success. 
The point here is not to argue that one system is better than the other. As 
Herstad points out, both systems have their strengths and weaknesses. The 
important lesson is rather that it is impossible to make an argument that is 
equally true for all kinds of foreign companies.  
If you ask whether foreign ownership is good for the national economy, we 
will have to ask back: What kind of foreign ownership? What kind of 
corporate governance are we talking about? And what kind of innovation 
activities are you looking for – short term investments, long term 
investments, incremental innovations, radical innovations? 
Do we need a special policy for foreign takeovers? 
It would be politically impossible to develop an innovation policy that 
discriminated against Anglo-Saxon, European or Japanese companies, based 
on a perceived need for one type of innovation.  
Moreover, given that we can find no clear distinctions between foreign-
owned companies and domestic companies as regards innovative 
capabilities in general, it is also unreasonable to develop a policy that 
discriminate against foreign investors per se, at least based on an innovation 
policy argument. 
Restrictions on foreign ownership 
Restrictions on foreign ownership do exist in the Nordic countries – mainly 
in strategic sectors such as public utilities, and natural resources like 
waterfalls and fish. However, during the past decades a common trust in the 
                                                 
9 See Sverre Herstad: “Theoretical perspectives on MNE organisation, strategy and subsidiary 
implications”, FOTON Report No. 2 (to be consisten cf. footnote 3 
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benefits of inward FDI has given a generally low level of restrictions in the 
Nordic region as well as in the whole OECD area. 
Both in Iceland and in Norway the governments seem to uphold the right to 
keep certain natural resources out of the hands of foreigners. One argument 
is that this generation has not the right to take these resources away form 
coming generations. Another argument is that fish or energy (waterfalls, 
mining, oil and gas) represent resources of vital interest to the future of the 
nation, and that they must be kept under national control for that reason.  
We suspect that it will be very hard to uphold this distinction in the future 
and that the pressure from the EU and WTO ultimately will lead to its 
removal.  
Moreover, we have no reason to believe that national control over these 
resources is needed from an innovation policy perspective. The Norwegian 
waterfalls were originally exploited by foreign investors, meaning that 
foreigners were the original innovators in this field.  
On the other hand, national ownership does not necessarily preclude 
international investments in the related industries. It is the national 
ownership that is protected in the case of Norwegian waterfalls and offshore 
fields. Foreigners may get the right to exploit and make use of the national 
resources in question. Moreover, the energy sector is a good example of an 
area of the Nordic economies that has been radically liberalised during the 
last decade. The common Nordic energy area proves this. Still, foreigners –
like national companies – may underinvest in innovation if they risk loosing 
their extraction rights after a certain period of time or as a result of mergers. 
The question of national ownership of vital resources is an issue that 
requires more deliberation. Some of the Nordic countries have already 
instigated such a debate. It is important that this debate is underpinned with 
a good analysis of the consequences foreign ownership will have for 
innovation in the relevant sectors. However, this is a task that goes far 
beyond this study. 
In general participation in the European market and the WTO agreements 
makes it very unlikely that the Nordic governments can make it harder for 
foreign companies to invest in the Nordic area, especially in the way of 
regulations. If one accepts these free establishment principles, one must also 
live with the consequences. 
This leaves only one efficient tool for ensuring national ownership, and that 
is state ownership of companies. The state can refuse to sell stock to foreign 
companies. This has been an argument for state ownership made in the 
Norwegian debate. The results are mixed. Government control of Statoil has 
clearly kept important parts of the oil and gas resources on Norwegian 
hands, but the government did not use its stock to stop Nordea from taking 
over Kreditkassen. Moreover, the idea of using state ownership as an active 
tool in a liberalised and global economy does not fit well with the neoliberal 
political hegemony today. Still, it should be noted that it is possible to use 
ownership as a tool in this respect. 
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Foreign takeovers are not bad for the Nordic economies in 
general 
As mentioned above, the FOTON team has not looked into the effect 
foreign takeovers have on employment. However, we have no reason to 
believe that foreign companies are more likely to close down companies 
than others. Nor have we found any evidence for the hypothesis that foreign 
takeovers lead to a decrease in innovation activities in general.  
If foreigners buy companies in order to get access to their knowledge base, 
it would normally make no sense to close down that knowledge base shortly 
after the takeover. These competences reside in the heads of local 
employees, and Scandinavians do probably not move that easily. 
Hence, we find weak support for the proposition that foreign takeovers – in 
general – are “bad for you”, and we do not recommend that the Nordic 
governments in general should try to stop foreign companies from taking 
over national firms. 
The need for foreign investments 
On the other hand, one could argue that we need more foreign direct 
investments to compensate for weak national financial markets.  
In general, the Nordic countries have well functioning venture capital 
markets. In Norway parts of industry do complain about a lack of capital, 
but this lack could be compensated for with public money.  
Still, there are quite a few examples of Nordic companies that have gone 
looking for international partners in order to get funding for more large 
scale innovation projects. Several of our case study respondents report that 
the need for more capital was an important motivation for accepting a 
foreign owner. 
In many cases foreign takeovers bring in much needed competences, 
including access to laboratories, complementary skills, networks of 
collaboration etc. 
Hence, in quite a few cases and in many industries, foreign takeovers can be 
beneficial. 
Possible conclusions 
This line of argument leads to several possible conclusions: 
1. Given that there are no clear distinctions between foreign owned and 
nationally-owned companies innovation wise, there is no need for a 
special policy targeting foreign ownership in general or takeovers in 
particular. 
2. Even if there are no clear distinctions between foreign and domestic 
companies in general, foreign ownership does entail certain 
advantages for the innovation system as a whole, including access to 
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capital and corporate and international networks. There is therefore a 
need for policy measures that makes the Nordic countries more 
attractive for foreign investments. 
3. According to the FOTON survey foreign companies seem to be less 
involved in the national innovation systems than domestic firms, 
which may lead to a suboptimal exchange of competences and 
technologies between these companies and the rest of the innovation 
system. Hence there is a need for policy measures that involves such 
companies more actively. 
There are certainly valid arguments for alternative 1 above. Given that the 
Nordic countries have accepted open markets and thrive from taking part in 
a global economy, these countries have already done enough to attract 
foreign investments. Hence there is no need for a more pro-active policy. 
However, if one accepts the heterogeneity of the innovation system, and the 
fact that different companies with different competences play different roles 
in the innovation system, one can clearly argue for the need of a policy that 
attracts foreign investments.  
All the Nordic countries have small internal markets and the economies 
must rely on exports. In order to survive in the global markets, many of the 
companies need to grow in order to get the weight needed to invest in 
innovation and marketing. In many cases this means that they will have to 
establish strategic alliances, buy other companies or be bought themselves. 
In this respect being taken over by a foreign company can be a good 
alternative. However, this means that foreign multinational must (1) know 
about the Nordic economies and (2) find them an attractive arena for 
investment. 
The Nordic countries as arenas for foreign investment 
In our chapter on policy analysis (p. 29) we have tried to make general 
assessments as regards the framework conditions for foreign investments in 
the Nordic countries. We have looked at the following parameters: 
• the stability and transparency of the political, economic and cultural 
system; 
• international legal obligations; 
• formal restrictions on FDI; 
• fiscal incentives and tax breaks; 
• measures for pro-active investment promotion; 
• access to public finance and instruments for facilitation; 
• access to international markets; 
• access to skills and expertise; 
• access to finance; 
• access to technological capabilities; 
• access to networks and clusters; 
• access to infrastructure; and 
- 22 - 
FOTON  Do we need a special policy for foreign takeovers? 
• cultural attitudes towards foreign investments. 
 
According to these – admittedly subjective – assessments made by the 
FOTON researchers, the Nordic countries should in general be attractive for 
foreign investors. This is mainly because of very positive framework 
conditions as regards political stability and transparency, participation in 
international trade regulations, access to international markets, access to 
skills, expertise, and technological capabilities, access to infrastructure, as 
well as the existence of strong networks and clusters.  
These countries are among the wealthiest in the world, and they are so for 
reasons that should be appealing, also for multinationals looking for a 
friendly harbour. 
It should be noted that this FOTON assessment is in harmony by the latest 
version of UNCTAD’s Foreign Direct Investment indicator. This is a 
composite indicator that is meant to give an indication of how attractive a 
country ought to be for foreign investors, given certain parameters. Among 
these we find factors such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, ICT 
infrastructure, commercial energy usage, R&D spending, tertiary education, 
risk factors, imports and exports, and the share of world FDI inward stock. 
As most composite indicators, this one has its weaknesses, and the reader 
should definitely not read to much into smaller variations as regards national 
rankings. 
According to this indicator all the Nordic countries must be considered FDI 
friendly, as they are all in the top 20 (out of 140 countries): 
Position Country 
2 Norway 
10 Sweden 
13 Finland 
15 Iceland 
19 Denmark 
 
Again, a very likely conclusion is that there is no need for a special policy in 
this field, as long as the Nordic countries continue to develop innovation 
and business friendly framework conditions. 
However, the fact that the Nordic countries are FDI friendly does not 
necessarily mean that they actually attract foreign investors. We must also 
find out to what extent foreigners actually invest in the Nordic countries.  
The Nordic countries have experienced a large increase in inward foreign 
direct investment since mid 1990s, and the number of employees in foreign-
controlled enterprises has increased significantly. In general it seems that 
the pattern of globalisation is about the same in the Nordic countries as in 
the other EU countries and in the US. 
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As can be seen from the figure below Sweden saw a large number of inward 
foreign acquisitions in the period 1996 to 2002.10 Finland, Norway and 
Denmark can be found near the average. 
However, it is more than reasonable to compare the Nordic countries with 
nations like the Netherlands, New Zealand, Ireland and Belgium, which 
means that Norway, Denmark, and Finland should be able to attract more 
foreign investments.11 
Figure 1 The value of inward merger and acquisitions in per cent of GDP, 1996-
2002 
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Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report based on data from Thomson Financial Corporation and 
compiled by ITPS. OECD is the source for GDP. 
                                                 
10 The value of takeovertakeovers in Sweden reached a unique high level in 1999, which mainly can be 
explained by two very big acquisitions (AstraZeneca and Volvo Cars). 
11 We lack some data for Iceland, which makes it harder to give an assessment. For a more detailed 
introduction to foreign investments in the Nordic countries, see the appendix to this report. 
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Policy recommendations12 
Given that the framework conditions are favourable to foreign investments 
in the Nordic countries, we would argue that the best option for attracting 
more foreign owners would be to market these countries as innovation 
friendly and knowledge intensive countries.  
In practice this means strengthening national “Invest in” organisations – 
organisations given the responsibility of promoting foreign investments. 
With the exception of Norway all the Nordic countries have such 
organisations. Norway should establish one, or give Innovation Norway a 
clear responsibility in this area followed by additional funding. 
To many foreigners, the Nordic countries look like one unified cultural area, 
which they to a large extent are. Because of this it would make sense to 
launch a Nordic initiative, profiling the Nordic or Scandinavian region as an 
attractive place for investments.  
New Nordic innovation and investment portal 
Very often it all boils down to a question of easy access to information. 
Hence we propose that the Nordic Council of Ministers consider the 
establishment of a new Nordic web portal, leading potential investors to 
relevant information and potential contacts. Such a web portal could contain 
information on: 
• local culture; 
• economic and regulatory framework conditions; 
• knowledge institutions and educational systems; 
• access to finance; 
• public infrastructure and innovation policy measures; 
• industries looking for partners; 
• essential statistics; 
• relevant public institutions, including the “Invest in” institutions; and 
• public and private consultants. 
 
Not all international investors and business managers are fluent in English. 
Hence it would make sense to present French, German, Spanish , Chinese 
and Japanese version of this portal as well – at least as regards the most 
essential information. The Nordic Ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministries of Industry should be involved, as should innovation, research 
and trade related councils and agencies and the local “Invest in” 
organisations. 
                                                 
12 These are the recommendations made by the FOTON research team. They should not be considered as 
recommendations made by the Nordic Innovation Centre, nor of the participating organisations. 
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Strengthening public understanding of foreign investments 
A policy aimed at attracting foreign investments may be followed by 
measures aimed at strengthening the public understanding of the effects of 
such investments. Many citizens are not fully aware of the potential benefits 
of FDI and its importance for the economy, like – for instance – that FDI 
can provide jobs and boost economic growth, bring Nordic companies into 
global business networks, give local businesses access to the latest 
technologies, lift the competitiveness of Nordic businesses at home and 
abroad, and so forth. A public uproar against foreign takeovers may make 
the Nordic countries less attractive for foreign investors. In other words, 
there may be need for an information campaign that aims at giving the 
public a nuanced view of the benefits of – and the problems following – 
foreign investments in general and foreign takeovers in particular. This can 
be done by active campaigns targeting press representatives and the media. 
The relevant ministries could involve public and private innovation, 
research and trade organisations in this work 
That being said, we do not believe that public opinion is a strong 
impediment to foreign investments in the Nordic countries at the moment. 
Some extraordinary cases, like the Volvo and Saab takeovers or Nordic 
bank mergers, will raise public debate, but in general foreign takeovers 
seem to be accepted as a normal business practice. 
We would also like to add that any public campaign regarding foreign 
ownership must open minded and take serious objections into 
considerations. There are valid arguments against a policy promoting 
foreign investments, and there may indeed be people and companies that 
loose when some acquisitions take place. These voices must be heard. 
Improving framework conditions 
The Nordic countries are already considered good arenas for foreign 
investments. Still, there will always be room for improvement. 
One area of particular interest is company taxation. Both in Finland and 
Denmark there have been a discussion on reducing taxes in order to make 
the countries more attractive for foreign investors. The Danish government 
has decided to lower the corporate tax from 30 to 28 per cent, putting it 
more on the level with the other Nordic countries. 
Indeed, there is reason to believe that some investors will shun a country if 
taxes are too high. However, it could also be that foreigners believe that 
Nordic tax levels are higher than they really are. If that is the case, an active 
information campaign involving a web site like the one presented above as 
well as national embassies and trade delegations could be of help. 
Foreign investors will normally look for the same factors as domestic 
companies, and innovation policy measures that make local companies 
thrive will normally also benefit foreign-owned companies. Among such 
measures are relevant R&D programs, administrative simplification etc. For 
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a further discussion of general innovation policy recommendation, see 
FOTON’s predecessor, the GoodNIP project.13 
The integration of foreign owned companies in the national 
innovation system 
We have argued that foreign companies in general are as innovative as 
domestic companies, and that they may even be better than national 
companies as regards innovation output. However, it seems that they are not 
that closely embedded in the national innovation systems, and that they do 
not take part in public R&D programs to the same extent as domestic 
companies. 
The foreign-owned companies may, of course, suffer for this, and given that 
they contribute to the national economy by way of employment and taxes, it 
should be in the national interest to get them more involved. 
However, the main argument for proposing such a policy is that the 
participation of these companies will strengthen the diffusion of 
competences from these companies to domestic companies. By taking part 
in public R&D programmes these companies will interact with other 
companies and knowledge institutions, contributing to important national 
learning processes.  
This argument also applies for participation in the EU Framework 
Programme. Having local branches of multinational companies on board 
will normally strengthen an application to the Commission. Such 
collaboration may also make it easier to improve the interaction between 
company affiliates in various countries, improving the flow of knowledge to 
the Nordic countries. 
The point here is not to introduce some kind of positive discrimination of 
foreign-owned companies, but to make research councils and similar 
institutions more conscious of the need to involve foreign companies in 
research and innovation programs.  
This often amounts to encouraging well known and trusted companies to 
involve foreign-owned affiliates in their applications and contacting R&D 
intensive foreign-owned companies that do not take part in such 
programmes. 
This approach should be limited to programs and measures that encourage 
cooperation and interaction between companies, and between companies 
and knowledge institutions. 
This approach can be combined with a clear strategy for investing in 
technologies, industries or disciplines that are of vital importance for the 
future development of the national economy, if these match the interest of 
foreign multinationals. This is especially important if the government wish 
                                                 
13 Good Practices in Nordic Innovation Polcies, Summary and Policy Recommendations, Oslo 2003. The 
reports can be downloaded from www.step.no/goodnip. 
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to develop “new” technologies, i.e. technologies and activities that are not 
already present in the innovation system. The development of – let’s say –
advanced biotechnology or nanotechnology could benefit from local 
representation of large international firms that can become developers as 
well as customers in this area. 
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Policy analysis 
By Amir Piric, with contributions from the national FOTON teams 
Establishing key policy parameters 
Since the early 1980s, the world economy has seen a rapid acceleration in 
foreign direct investments (FDI). Among many things, growth in FDI has 
accompanied global specialisation, where companies search internationally 
for market opportunities where the quality and price of resources provide 
attractive returns.  
More firms in more industries from more countries engage in FDI activity to 
exploit the comparative advantages of locating their operations in different 
countries. Participation in international markets, through investment as well 
as trade, is essential for many firms and national economies to continue to 
grow, and in this context virtually all countries now compete to attract or 
retain global enterprises.   
Due to the significant role it plays in the world economy, FDI is often on the 
top of the policy agenda.  
This is partly caused by the fear that foreign takeovers will weaken the 
national innovation system, by for instance leading to a transfer of national 
assets abroad or to a weakening of the innovation activities of the local 
units. 
At the other end this interest is based on a perceived need for more foreign 
direct investments – i.e. funding – and knowledge transfer. Hence a foreign 
greenfield investment is considered a good thing, as it adds financial and 
human capital to the local innovation system. However, a foreign takeover 
may give the same effect, if the local unit survives the acquisition. 
As argued elsewhere in these reports, the FOTON research does not indicate 
that foreign takeovers, in general, are more or less beneficial for the 
national companies that are taken over, than other forms of acquisitions.  
Moreover, it should be noted that we have focused on the effects the 
takeovers have on the innovative capabilities of the local units and their 
surroundings. We have not looked at other effects of the acquisitions, like 
employment or national control of natural resources.  
However, foreign takeovers may have a different effect than national 
takeovers. Hence a foreign takeover may strengthen the national unit’s 
international network, while at the same time weakening its national 
collaboration. Whether the national innovation system is strengthened or 
weakened by this is hard to ascertain. The wide variety of foreign 
multinationals and national firms certainly makes it difficult to make 
generalisations in this respect. 
Still, given the fact that Nordic firms are operating in small national 
markets, and thus are forced to go abroad if they want to expand, find more 
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capital or develop more extensive competence networks, we would argue 
that takeovers may be very beneficial for the national innovation systems. 
Hence, this aspect should be taken into consideration when governments 
develop national innovation policies.14 
Regardless of the overall policy approach taken by different governments - 
i.e. active (FDI promotion) versus passive (FDI mitigation) or somewhere in 
between - there are several factors which can influence, either encourage or 
discourage, FDI on both demand and supply side.   
It remains a bit unclear what actually constitutes an “optimal” set of policies 
for FDI, and almost every country needs to customise its policies in order to 
meet country-specific needs and aspirations. Based on research done by e.g. 
the World Bank15, OECD16 and UNCTAD17 as well as the findings in the 
FOTON project, it is possible to summarise some of the critical policy 
parameters that drive FDI, namely: 
• Regulatory environment; 
• non-regulatory measures; and 
• additional factors (e.g. access to markets and access to skills and expertise). 
The quantity and quality of the interface and interplay of these factors will 
largely determine the dynamics of FDI, including the configuration and 
impact it has on any given economy, both in terms of outcomes and related 
policy measures. The following discussion will introduce broad descriptions 
of the factors outlined above. 
                                                 
14 The following quote from OECD’s Policy Brief  on Foreign Direct Investment for Development , the 
OECD Observer 2002, exemplifies common contemporary ideas about the effects of foreign direct 
investments: 
“The overall benefits of FDI for developing country economies are well documented. Given the 
appropriate host-country policies and a basic level of development, a preponderance of studies shows that 
FDI triggers technology spillovers, assists human capital formation, contributes to international trade 
integration, helps create a more competitive business environment and enhances enterprise development. 
All of these contribute to higher economic growth, which is the most potent tool for alleviating poverty in 
developing countries. Moreover, beyond the strictly economic benefits, FDI may help improve 
environmental and social conditions in the host country by, for example, transferring “cleaner” 
technologies and leading to more socially responsible corporate policies. While FDI on the whole is 
greatly beneficial to the development process, it must be recognised that certain drawbacks (“costs”) may 
occur. These drawbacks arguably reflect shortcomings in the domestic policies of host countries, but 
important challenges may nevertheless arise when these shortcomings cannot easily be addressed. 
Potential drawbacks include a deterioration of the balance of payments as profits are repatriated (albeit 
often offset by incoming FDI), social disruptions as a consequence of accelerated commercialisation in 
less developed countries, and the effects on competition in national markets. Moreover, some host 
country authorities perceive an increasing dependence on internationally operating enterprises as 
representing a loss of political sovereignty.” 
15 http://rru.worldbank.org/PapersLinks/Policies-Attract-Foreign-Direct-Investment/ 
16 http://www.oecd.org/searchResult/0,2665,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html 
17 http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2095&lang=1 
- 30 - 
FOTON  Establishing key policy parameters 
Regulatory environment 
FDI is dependent on a supportive regulatory environment (both domestically 
and internationally) and business climate. The regulatory environment is 
critical to FDI as it affects costs (administrative and technical barriers) and 
the level of competition among firms, thereby impacting on firm efficiency. 
Good regulatory practice is therefore part of an integrated approach to FDI. 
In this context, four broad areas of the regulatory environment are 
important: 
Stability and transparency of the system 
A stable and transparent regulatory environment, including political and 
socio-economic stability, is often perceived as critical to investment 
decision-making. Instability and obscurity in the system can be very 
destructive and result in negative trends, such as negligible FDI inflows, 
corruption and overall insecurity among investors. Therefore it is necessary 
to make the regulatory system as stable and transparent as possible, 
preferably with little or no “red-tape”. 
International legal obligations 
Being part of a larger economic cooperation area, along with harmonisation 
and synchronisation of rules within parameters given by the European 
Union and World Trade Organisation, means that the space for policy 
manoeuvre is relatively limited, especially in the context of competition 
laws, labour laws, anti-trust laws and so forth.   
Formal restrictions on FDI 
FDI flows are evidently affected by the existence of formal restrictions on 
foreign ownership. Such restrictions may include majority domestic 
ownership requirements, obligatory screening and approval procedures as 
well as operational controls on foreign companies such as constraints on the 
number of foreign employees or board members. 
Fiscal incentives and tax breaks 
Fiscal incentives and tax breaks are types of regulatory measures that are 
often used to attract FDI. Ireland is a recent example of successful impacts 
of such policies. However, these types of policies are usually good in the 
short run, but less desirable in the long run as fiscal systems in principle are 
very static and often exhibit discomfort with highly dynamic measures. 
Non-regulatory measures 
Non-regulatory measures are often used as an integral part of pro-active 
investment promotion policies. They can take several different forms and 
shapes but the most commonly used measures are those which are actively 
seeking for foreign investors, usually through designated agencies. 
Sometimes these agencies are attached to diplomatic missions or embassies 
abroad.  
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Pro-active investment promotion 
This type of investment promotion involves active promotion of a country 
as an investment destination through presentations in bilateral and 
multilateral fora. It is often used to identify and match investment 
opportunities and for undertaking customised market research (e.g. using 
sector strategies and taskforces as sources for research into industry value 
gaps and investment opportunities). 
Facilitation and/or targeted grants 
Facilitation is often seen as a form of “soft” measure whereby both central 
and local authorities aim at building investment relationships and networks 
between local firms and foreign investors. It also involves helping out 
foreign investors to obtain different environmental compliance permits and 
to provide guidance through regulatory requirements. Sometimes, so-called 
targeted grants are used in order to complete feasibility studies or risk 
analysis for both/several parties. 
Additional parameters 
FDI rarely takes place just because of a highly favourable regulatory 
environment or highly effective non-regulatory measures. Additional 
factors, such as access to markets, technological capabilities and/or highly 
skilled labour and expertise, are primus inter pares reasons why companies 
decide to invest in any given country.  
Access to markets 
This is perhaps one of the most commonly cited factors attracting FDI. 
Investors are constantly on search for new markets, including access to 
domestic and regional markets (such as the Nordic area and the EEA). The 
more open and integrated domestic market any given country has, the more 
likely it is going to attract foreign investors, especially “high-quality” FDI. 
Access to skills and expertise 
A wide range of skills and capabilities are critical to firms’ ability to pursue 
innovative and entrepreneurial opportunities. Highly skilled labour and 
presence of critical expertise are of pivotal relevance to foreign investors 
and it often happens that domestic firms get acquired by foreign firms 
because they have a skilful workforce and unique expertise. 
Access to finance 
FDI often takes place because there is a potential for attracting more 
investment and enlarging the pool of potential investors. This is in particular 
relevant if a foreign firm is keen to gain access to regional stock exchange 
markets.  
However, given the small financial markets in the Nordic countries, the 
more likely motivation for a takeover is the local company’s need for 
funding or access to capital markets in larger countries. 
- 32 - 
FOTON  Key policy parameters and their relevance and impact 
Access to technological capabilities 
Access to specific technological capabilities is often cited as one of the 
major reasons why foreign firms want to be present in a certain market 
and/or overtake a certain local firm.  
Not surprisingly, access to technological capabilities is critical in many of 
the “new economy” areas, such as ICT, biotechnology and 
nanotechnologies. In addition, presence of significant S&T capabilities 
along with world-class research institutes is very important. 
Access to networks and clusters 
Networks and linkages between businesses, local and central governments, 
community organisations, institutions, customers and advisors are critical to 
the development of innovative and dynamic economic regions. In recent 
years foreign investors have been very keen on accessing, via takeovers, 
different clusters and networks, especially in high tech areas. 
Access to infrastructure 
Among many factors, firms rely on high quality infrastructure to produce 
goods and services, maintain contracts, and get products to markets on time 
and at the lowest possible cost. Hence foreign investors are keen to have a 
reliable supply of energy and high quality telecommunications and transport 
services in their host countries. 
Cultural attitudes 
The presence of supportive cultural attitudes - namely positive attitudes 
towards FDI, is often cited as critical to successful outcomes of FDI in any 
given country. Hostile attitudes and distrust may lead to withdrawal and a 
gradual disappearance of foreign investors. 
Key policy parameters and their relevance and impact 
Clearly, the relevance and consequent impact of policy parameters will 
differ among countries. The FOTON project has assessed the relevance and 
impact of different policy parameters in the Nordic countries.  
These assessments have been made by the FOTON project teams and are 
based on their knowledge of the effects of foreign direct investments and 
related innovation policy issues and instruments. Hence these are subjective 
qualitative appraisals presented for didactic purposes, and they must be 
treated as such. 
The idea behind these appraisals and the corresponding table is to give the 
reader a visualisation of the framework conditions that influence foreign 
companies’ propensity to invest in a Nordic country. 
The reader should keep in mind that success in this area does not necessarily 
require a “top score” along all dimensions. Some companies will consider 
some factors to be more important than others. Furthermore, strength in one 
area may compensate for less favourable conditions in another. 
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Furthermore, it is important to remember that innovation policies are not 
primarily developed out of concern for foreign investors, nor should they 
necessarily be so. There are other needs that have to be met, some of them 
also outside the area of innovation policy. 
On the other hand, as has been repeated over and over again in the three 
FOTON reports, there is not necessarily a clear distinction between the 
behaviour and needs of foreign and nationally based companies. What is 
important for foreign multinationals may be equally important for national 
companies and nationally based multinationals. Hence to a large extent 
innovation policy strategies and measures aimed at stimulating business 
innovation in general overlap with potential measures aimed at encouraging 
foreign direct investments. 
The results are presented in table 3-1. As can be read from the table, the 
primus inter pares policy parameters for the Nordic region as a whole are 
identified to be stability & transparency of the system, international legal 
obligations, access to skills and expertise and access to technological 
capabilities.    
Table 5 Key policy parameters and their relevance and impact (R&I) 
Nordic Countries 
 
  N S DK IS SF 
Stability and transparency of the 
system 
4 4 4 4 4 
International legal obligations  4 4 4 4 4 
Regulatory 
Environment 
Fiscal incentives and tax breaks 1 2 3 1 1 
Pro-active investment promotion 0 4 2 3 1 Non-
regulatory 
Measures Facilitation and/or targeted grants 
0 1 1 1 0 
Access to markets 3 4 4 2 3 
Access to skills and expertise 4 4 4 4 4 
Access to finance 1 2 3 2 1 
Access to technological capabilities 4 4 4 4 4 
Access to networks and clusters 1 4 4 4 3 
Access to infrastructure 3 4 3 2 3 
Additional 
Factors 
Cultural attitudes 3 3 3 3 4 
Legend: 
0 No relevance and impact  
1 Insignificant relevance and impact 
2 Low relevance and impact 
3 Medium relevance and impact 
4 High relevance and impact 
 
Assessment for Denmark 
In terms of the business environment, the Danish economy is very stable 
with a sound macro economic policy. Denmark is along with the other 
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Nordic countries traditionally ranked among the top countries with the most 
competitive economies in the world. Most recently in the Global 
Competitiveness Report 2004-2005 released by the World Economic Forum, 
Denmark is placed as the 5th most competitive economy in the world.18 The 
country furthermore has a stable and international regulatory environment. 
The political system in Denmark is fairly stable, although the current 
government to a higher extent than the previous ones are executing a bloc 
politic compared to the traditional wide agreements over “the centre”. An 
example of this is the so-called tax-freeze, which has limited the 
manoeuvrability of the legislators in the way that they cannot impose new 
taxes unless the same amount or more are released through other tax-breaks.  
Furthermore, the current government has tightened the legislation towards 
immigrants and refugees. Internationally this has given Denmark a 
somewhat rightwing image that might influence the general perception of 
Denmark from a foreign investor’s point of view. It is hard to predict what 
will come out of the bloc policy especially if the majority shifts towards the 
opposition after a new election. One thing is clear; the political climate is 
less stable than in the preceding years.  
Denmark has a high level of taxation as regards personal taxes. In the 
aforementioned Global Competitiveness Report the taxation regulations and 
the taxation level are pointed out as the biggest obstacles for doing business 
in Denmark.19 However, the corporate taxation is relatively low (30 per cent 
in 2004) and there is a low taxation for expatriates (25 per cent).20 In 2005, 
the corporate taxation will be reduced to 28 per cent.21 In comparison, the 
EU14 average22 is 31,4 per cent, the OECD average 30 per cent and the 
EU25 average 26 per cent in 2004.23   
Concerning the non-regulatory measures, there generally is some focus on 
foreign investment initiatives in Denmark and the government encourages 
foreign investments. One of the pro-active initiatives is Invest in Denmark 
under the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2003, Invest in Denmark 
participated in 36 investment projects and created 781 jobs24. An example 
of a more regional inward investment agency is Copenhagen Capacity, 
which is an investment agency for foreign companies that are interested in 
locating in the Danish capital region25. In 2003, Copenhagen Capacity 
contributed to the establishment of 24 new investments in the region, which 
                                                 
18 The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005, The World Economic Forum, http://www.weforum.org  
19 ”Nordiske lande har den bedste konkurrenceevne”, Berlingske Tidende, 14 October 2004, 
www.berlingske.dk  
20 www.investindk.com 
21 ”Dansk Skat i mellemklassen”, Berlingske Tidende, 25. November 2004, www.berlingske.dk  
22 EU15 minus Denmark 
23 Skatteministeriet, ”Oversigt over selskabsskattesatser i EU25”, 24 November 2004, www.skat.dk  
24 Invest in Denmark , ”You are looking at the best location in Europe... DENMARK”, 
www.investindk.com 
25 www.copcap.dk  
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led to almost 400 directly-created jobs and just over 350 indirectly-created 
jobs26. 
 
The geographical location close to the Nordic countries and the Baltic Sea 
Region gives access to markets of 24 million and 93 million inhabitants 
respectively. Moreover, the country has close proximity to the central EU 
market. In general the workforce is well-educated and international minded 
with good language skills. There is however, still room for improvements. 
According to the aforementioned global competitiveness report, Denmark 
scores a 16th place with regards to the number of people getting a higher 
education.27  
A wide range of sources of finance exist in Denmark, from public incentives 
and private investors to banks, venture capitalists, and the Copenhagen 
Stock Exchange. The technological capabilities are also among the top. The 
well-educated workforce enables a high technological capability. Special 
attention is given from the political system to certain areas such as nano-
technology.28 Other areas where clusters with leading R&D centres have 
emerged are within mobile telephony in North Jutland and the 
Biotech/Medico cluster in the so-called Medical Valley in the Øresund 
region. 
The infrastructure in Denmark is well functioning both with regards to the 
physical infrastructure with good and extensive railroad and freeway 
networks and not least the ICT infrastructure. The latter is among the best 
with a high penetration of PCs and private Internet connections of which an 
increasing amount is via broadband. An early liberalisation within the 
telecommunication market has derived a competitive market with low data 
and telecommunication rates. In the recent IDC’s Information Society 
Index, which measures the abilities of 53 nations to participate in the 
information revolution, Denmark was ranked as the top nation.29  
Finally, with regards to cultural attitudes the official attitude is positive 
towards foreigners and not least their investments. However, among some 
political parties and the general population there is emerging a less positive 
attitude towards “foreigners” at large. In the longer term, this can influence 
the attitude towards foreign ownership of Danish assets and takeovers of 
Danish companies. 
                                                 
26 Copenhagen Capcity, ”Annual Report 2003”, p. 3, www.copcap.dk  
27 ”Skatten er stadig det største problem”, Berlingske Tidene, 14 October 2004 
28 Ministeriet for Videnskab Teknology og Udvikling ”Fokus på fremtiden, Nanoteknologi – resultat af 
faglig dialog”, August 2004 
29 IDC – Press Release, ”Denmark Displaces Sweden as Top Ranking Nation in IDC’s Information 
Society Index”, 2 November 2004, www.idc.com  
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Table 6 Summary assessment for Denmark 
KEY PARAMETERS 
Regulatory Environment 
Stability and transparency of the system Fairly good, stable & predictable  Consistent rules and transparent processes 
International legal obligations 
Important 
Openness of the economy for FDI a self-evident 
requirement as an EU member country  
Fiscal incentives and tax breaks 
Fairly important 
Taxes still perceived as high among general population. 
Corporate taxation however is low. 
Non-regulatory Measures 
Pro-active investment promotion 
Moderate importance 
Investments agencies such as Invest in Denmark and 
Copenhagen Capacity promote Denmark with reasonable 
success. 
Facilitation and/or targeted grants Not important More or less absent 
Additional Factors 
Access to markets 
Very important 
Ideal geographical location in relation to the Nordic 
countries and the Baltic Sea Region as well as the close 
proximity to the central EU. 
Access to skills and expertise 
Very important 
Education system provides high quality labour 
International minded workforce 
Access to finance 
Important 
A wide range of sources of finance exist including a 
well-established market for venture capital 
Access to technological capabilities 
Very important 
The highly educated workforce derives high 
technological capabilities 
Political focus on nano-technology 
Access to networks and clusters 
Very important 
Special regions such as the Medical valley with high 
concentration of universities and medical industry and 
the mobile telephony in North Jutland. 
Access to infrastructure 
Important 
Well functioning infrastructure. Highly developed and 
penetrated IT infrastructure with low data and 
telecommunication rates 
Cultural attitudes 
Important 
Government supportive, public a bit reluctant 
Current attention and policies concerning foreigners 
establishes a somewhat negative attitude 
Assessment for Finland 
Finland's business environment has been rated in numerous international 
comparisons as one of the most favourable in the world. The national 
innovation system is generally working well even if there is always room 
for improvement. Also, the regulatory environment is transparent and 
predictable. The stable societal system including the welfare, health and 
educational system is seen as a major asset for Finland as a location for FDI. 
Despite of the favourable business environment, Finland has succeeded to 
attract less inward FDI than many other EU or OECD countries. The 
volume of inward FDI in relation to annual GDP was in average 4,6 per cent 
between 1999 and 2001, whereas the EU average was 6,9 per cent in the 
same period. Finland is a net exporter of direct investment capital: The 
amount of outward FDI has been circa two times higher than inward FDI.  
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Policies towards foreign direct investments have changed substantially 
during the past twenty years. In the 1980s, restrictive policies on foreign 
ownership and FDI were still at place. The gradual liberalisation of national 
legislation on capital movements since the late 1980s was triggered by 
global economic and political trends and international legal obligations 
which Finland had engaged in. The European integration process and 
Finland’s accession to the EU in 1995 gave the final thrust for the 
abolishment of the remaining controls on FDI and foreign ownership, 
including acquirement of real property. The international ties were further 
strengthened by Finland’s decision to join the Euro-zone among the first 
ones from the beginning of 2002.   
Fiscal incentives and tax breaks for FDI have traditionally not belonged to 
Finland’s policy toolbox even if there is a fixed-term tax scheme for key 
staff members immigrating from abroad. This scheme is however rather 
insignificant because of too strict requirements set for eligibility (on 
average, the scheme has covered 150-200 people per year) and there is 
identified a need to reform the scheme. Instead, foreign owned companies 
are eligible for government incentives on an equal footing with Finnish-
owned companies. The adopted policy can be crystallized as follows: 
Finland does not compete for investments in terms of company subsidies or 
tax concessions but on the ground of the business environment available and 
country specific strengths. The chosen policy guideline emphasises a non-
discriminatory approach towards domestic and foreign owned firms alike.  
Overall, the legal and fiscal environment in Finland is stable and do not 
discriminate against foreign owned companies. The current corporate tax 
rate is 29 per cent which is the same as the capital gains tax rate. Finland 
applies the so-called "avoir fiscal" system in eliminating the double taxation 
of company income and dividends. The taxation of personal incomes is 
progressive and the marginal tax rate is internationally, if not in the Nordic 
terms, high. 
In recent years, a re-emergent theme in the public discussion has been the 
demand for more thorough regulatory reforms in relation to taxation. In late 
2003, the Government presented its plan to reform company and capital 
income taxation. The reform aims to reinforce the international competitive 
position of the Finnish tax system which, in turn, should promote 
companies’ investment, growth and their capacity to generate employment. 
A main item of the reform is a reduction of the corporate income tax rate by 
3 percentage units to 26 per cent, as well as a reduction of the capital tax 
rate by 1 percentage unit to 28 per cent. Besides changes in the tax rates, the 
government plan includes a more profound reform of company and capital 
income taxation including taxation of dividends and the abolishment of the 
"avoir fiscal" system. The reform of company and capital income taxation is 
scheduled to come into force from the beginning of 2005.  
In the current tax legislation is an item which in some instances has 
discriminated against foreign investors investing in Finnish venture capital 
funds in comparison to domestic investors. The majority of equity and 
venture funds in Finland have been organised as limited partnerships 
(kommandiittiyhtiö) in which the management company acts as the general 
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partner. This has facilitated limited liability and tax transparency for 
domestic investors. In accordance with the law, however, foreign corporate 
investors investing in the limited partnership may be deemed to have a 
permanent place of business in Finland and therefore subject for taxation. 
The Government has announced its plan to ensure the equality of foreign 
and domestic investors in Finland which in practice means an amendment to 
the tax law. The timeline for the revision is not yet announced.  
In Finland, globalization has so far been characterised by a strong 
orientation outwards. The development of internationally competitive 
products, services and innovations and the promotion of export efforts of 
domestic firms have had a central position in national policies. 
Concurrently, the large domestic companies have rapidly increased their 
activities and production abroad. Promotion of inward foreign investments 
on the other hand has not belonged to central issues in policy-making. One 
of the few existing initiatives is the Invest in Finland bureau, which is a 
national organisation promoting foreign direct investments in Finland.30  
Continuous investments in education and technology development as well 
as in the development of national and regional innovation environments 
have had a key role in increasing Finland’s attractiveness as a business 
location in recent years. Finland presents itself outwards as a world-class 
centre of knowledge and expertise which offers a viable location for 
international research and development investments. The ICT sector, the 
forest industry and associated branches are most often named as national 
strengths which also attract foreign investments. The potential 
risk/possibility of subsequent foreign takeover when investing in R&D and 
the development of expertise and know-how is an accepted part of the game.   
In general, foreign ownership is not seen as a threat among Finnish 
decision-makers nor among the public. This does not mean, however, that 
critical voices would be non-existing. On the contrary, in the public debate 
concerns about the impacts of foreign ownership typically emerge whenever 
a major acquisition or merger of a domestic firm takes place. The official 
policy adopted is however pro FDI. This is well illustrated in the following 
excerpt from the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s 2004 report on policy 
guidelines for foreign investments: "from perspective of competitiveness of 
national economy it is more fundamental where the companies locate, 
expand activities and increase manpower than who owns the companies". 
                                                 
30 http://www.investinfinland.fi 
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Table 7 Summary assessment for Finland 
KEY PARAMETERS 
Regulatory Environment 
Stability and transparency of the system 
Stable societal system (incl. welfare, health and 
education) and transparent legislation key national assets 
Cons: smallness, language etc.  
International legal obligations 
Very important 
Openness of the economy for FDI a self-evident 
requirement for the EU member country 
Fiscal incentives and tax breaks 
Insignificant 
A tax concession scheme for key staff members 
immigrating from abroad 
The scheme defined too narrowly today 
Personal taxes perceived high in int. comparison 
Non-regulatory Measures 
Pro-active investment promotion 
Insignificant if not non-existent 
Invest in Finland full-time engaged with, but under-
resourced in int. comparison 
Need to strengthen co-operation between public 
organisations 
A few municipal agencies promoting investments 
Proactive stance needed from regional actors to attract 
investments fitting well with local expertise and know-
how 
Facilitation and/or targeted grants 
Non-existent 
Foreign owned companies, however, on a par with 
domestic firms in use of public support measures 
Particularly R&D intensive foreign owned firms 
welcome in research & technology programmes  
Additional Factors 
Access to markets 
Very important 
Finland as a base for domestic market and neighbouring 
areas within Baltic Sea rim (Russia, the Baltic countries) 
and the EU markets  
Access to skills and expertise 
Very important 
Continuous investment in highly qualified work force 
Access to R&D funding and domestic innovation 
environment 
Access to finance 
Insignificant 
Same financial channels available as for the domestic 
firms  
Foreign owned companies have good knowledge of 
international finance market 
Access to technological capabilities Very important (see Access to skills and expertise above) 
Access to networks and clusters 
Currently medium R&I, but so far, under-utilised 
Could be used more consciously in promotion FDI 
Mutual gains for domestic networks/clusters and foreign 
owned firms (learning etc.) 
Access to infrastructure 
Very important 
Well working domestic innovation environment a major 
selling argument 
Logistics, Finland as a gateway to Russian and the Baltic 
countries' markets 
Long distances a hinder 
Cultural attitudes 
Important 
Official policy positive and open towards FDI and 
foreign ownership 
Procedures for work and residence permits too rigid and 
slow 
Prejudices still exist against foreigners 
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Assessment for Iceland 
Iceland has a long tradition of political stability and democratic government. 
The civil code is closely related to Nordic laws and regulations and largely 
harmonized with the European legal system. It has been a clear policy by 
the Icelandic government to facilitate competitiveness of the national 
industries, resulting in Iceland being ranked number one of European 
countries in terms of competitiveness in the IMD World competitiveness 
yearbook 2004.31 The main strengths are governmental efficiency, a strong 
societal framework, a strong domestic economy and high business 
efficiency, due to strong flexibility and people’s adaptability.  
The Icelandic government has managed to make the environment of doing 
business in Iceland much better than it used to be. Framework conditions are 
in many cases better than abroad. The tax system has been made more 
transparent, and the company income tax rate at 18 per cent is among the 
lowest in Europe. Many taxes, such as property tax, have been abandoned as 
have various costs related to doing business. The interest rate is lower than 
it has been for quiet a long time but still not yet competitive to other 
countries.  
Iceland is an active participant in international organizations such as the 
OECD, WTO and the European Economic Area (EEA). This means that 
Icelanders are rather well aware of the development of economic procedures 
abroad, despite the geographical distance from the major markets in Europe 
in the south and east and America in the west. 
Since the beginning of 1995, in accordance with the EEA agreement, capital 
movements have been fully liberalized, with the exception of certain 
restrictions that apply to foreign direct investments in fisheries and fish 
processing, energy production and distribution, and aviation companies. 
Foreign exchange controls have been fully abolished in Iceland since 1995, 
although the Central Bank is authorized to impose temporary restrictions on 
capital outflows in the event of exceptional circumstances. This has never 
been done, however.  
Non-residents may invest in a business enterprise in Iceland with some 
limitations, which are stipulated in the Act on Investment by Non-Residents 
in Business Enterprise or in specific legislation, and upon the fulfilment of 
other conditions and acquisition of licenses required by law. Under the 
European Economic Area Agreement, investment in Iceland by EEA 
residents is in principle free, but a few exceptions were negotiated in 
specific fields considered to be of national political importance. 
New foreign enterprises operating in Iceland that set up a branch or 
subsidiary are obliged to register with the Register of Limited Companies, 
and for others than residents of the EEA/OECD countries, certain 
requirements are made regarding minimum number of board directors 
resident in Iceland. EEA residents do not require work permits or residence 
permits.  
                                                 
31 see http://www01.imd.ch/documents/wcc/content/ranking.pdf 
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Restrictions on investment by foreign entities in fisheries are the only ones 
that apply to EEA residents. They have the purpose of protecting the 
nation’s exclusive rights to the fishing grounds around Iceland. Only the 
following may conduct fishing operations within the Icelandic fisheries 
jurisdiction or own or run enterprises engaged in fish processing32: 
• Icelandic citizens and other Icelandic entities; 
• Icelandic legal entities wholly owned by Icelandic entities or Icelandic legal 
entities, which are:  
• Controlled by Icelandic entities; 
• not under more than 25 per cent ownership of foreign entities (up to 33 per 
cent in certain circumstances); 
• in other respects under the ownership of Icelandic citizens or Icelandic legal 
entities controlled by Icelandic entities.  
Only Icelandic citizens and other Icelandic entities, as well as individuals 
and legal entities domiciled in another member state of the European 
Economic Area, are permitted to own energy exploitation rights as regards 
waterfalls and geothermal energy for other than domestic use. The same 
applies to enterprises, which produce or distribute energy. The maximum 
total shareholding owned by non-residents (except residents of a country 
that is a member of the European Economic Area) in Icelandic airline 
companies is 49 per cent. Special permission must be applied for from the 
Minister of Commerce in the case of investment in Icelandic enterprises by 
foreign states, foreign municipalities or other foreign authorities involved in 
enterprises.  
Broadly speaking, Iceland does not offer direct subsidies for business 
investment. Its prime incentives lie in the favourable environment for 
businesses in general, including low corporation tax at 18 per cent, 
competitive labour costs and payroll costs, and low electricity prices. 
Industrial sites are available around Iceland at competitive cost. Local 
communities may offer certain further incentives.  As a member of the EEA, 
Iceland has access to EU research funds for R&D programmes and joint 
ventures undertaken with companies from at least one other EEA country.  
Iceland has however established a special tax concession for international 
trading houses which can be established and registered in Iceland to perform 
business in their own name with foreign parties outside the country. Those 
companies pay corporate tax of only 5 per cent instead of 18 per cent. 
Further special incentives are granted for film and television production in 
Iceland. These projects can get back certain cost of the production until 
2006. 
                                                 
32 Fish processing means any processing that preserves marine products from decay including production 
of fish oil and fish meal, but does not include further processing designed to render products more 
suitable for distribution or consumption. Canning of seafood, however, is open to foreign investment. 
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In 1995, the Invest in Iceland Agency was established as an independent 
agency under the Ministry of Industry. The main task of the agency is to 
attract foreign direct investment to Iceland and assist foreign companies. 
This is a “one stop shop” for foreign investors. The agency has been 
efficient in publishing material about Iceland as an investment alternative.33 
With regards to other factors relevant to inward FDI, Iceland has a well-
developed infrastructure with technological and education infrastructure as 
the main strong points. The country has a skilful and well educated 
workforce. University education is among the highest in the world and 
university studies abroad are very frequent. This enables the Icelanders to 
use experience form different parts of the world to solve problems at hand. 
Iceland has moreover developed a very prominent system of life long 
education, a system that EU considers among the best in Europe. 
The cultural attitudes towards foreign industrial ownership in Iceland are 
generally positive. All in all, both the government and the public are 
supportive of inward investments. However, better communication of the 
benefits of FDI is needed. 
                                                 
33 see http://www.invest.is/ 
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Table 4 Summary assessment for Iceland 
KEY PARAMETERS 
Regulatory Environment 
Stability and transparency of the system 
Very good, stable and predictable  
Consistent rules and transparent processes 
Some restrictions on FDI non-residents 
International legal obligations 
Important, especially EEA regulation 
Restrictions in fisheries, energy & aviation 
More openness is needed (e.g. aviation) 
Fiscal incentives and tax breaks 
Special tax concessions for international trading 
houses and film and TV production 
Low corporate tax 
Better communication of tax rules is needed 
Non-regulatory Measures 
Pro-active investment promotion 
Important 
Active promotion through Invest in Iceland 
Diversification of promotion is needed 
Facilitation and/or targeted grants 
Facilitation partly achieved through Invest in 
Iceland 
Absence of targeted grants 
Better coordination is needed 
Additional Factors 
Access to markets 
Important 
Access to Scandinavian and EU markets 
Better communication of opportunities 
Access to skills and expertise 
Very important 
Education system provides high quality labour 
Better liaison with firms is needed 
Access to finance 
Less important 
Small local financial market 
Better communication on financial constraints 
Access to technological capabilities 
Very important 
Good S&T capabilities 
Enhancement of S&T capabilities is needed 
Access to networks and clusters 
Less important 
Critical to expansion and building networks 
Better communication on clusters is needed 
Access to infrastructure 
Important 
Very good maritime cargo facilities 
Further infrastructure improvements needed 
Cultural attitudes 
Important 
Government and public supportive 
Better communication on benefits is needed 
Assessment for Norway 
In terms of the business environment, investment conditions in Norway are 
generally favourable. The country has an open, stable economy with no 
foreign exchange controls and a sound macroeconomic policy. After a series 
of cuts over the past two years, the key interest rate of the central bank is 
currently 1,75 per cent. The corporate tax rate is 28 per cent which is below 
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the EU15 average at 31,4 per cent.34 Norway furthermore has a stable 
political system, and generally runs transparent, non-discriminatory rules.  
Along with Iceland, Norway is the only Nordic country who has not joined 
the EU. As a party to the European Economic Area (EAA) Agreement and a 
member of international organisations such as the OECD, WTO and IMF, 
the country is however firmly integrated in the international system of rules 
regulating investment and trade.  
In accordance with the EEA agreement, foreign nationals and foreign owned 
companies are free to acquire real estate in Norway as well as shares in 
Norwegian companies without any government interference. This is 
however a fairly recent development. In 1995, the Law on Industrial 
Acquisitions (Ervervsloven) replaced the relevant paragraphs in the 
Concession Law of 1917 (Industrikonsesjonsloven) under which foreign 
acquisitions of real estate or shares of companies holding rights to real 
estate in Norway required a government concession.  
Under the new law, the concession requirements were replaced by a 
reporting system which required any acquisition of more than one third of a 
Norwegian company - by foreign and Norwegian actors alike - to be 
reported to the government. The Law on Industrial Acquisitions was 
abolished in 2002.  
While this meant that there no longer existed any general regulations of 
foreign industrial ownership in Norway, restrictions still apply in specific 
areas of the economy. FDI is e.g. prohibited or restricted in basic utilities, 
the arms industry, waterfalls, mines and in areas where the government 
holds a monopoly, such as retail sales of wine and spirits. 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) has recently questioned the 
Norwegian restrictions on ownership of waterfalls (hjemfallsretten). As a 
result the Government in April 2003 established a Commission for the 
Reclaiming of Property Rights (Hjemfallsutvalget). The Commission 
delivered its green paper in November 2004 (NOU 2004:26 Hjemfall) . The 
mandate was rather restrictive, as it was clear that the government wanted a 
continuation of existing regulations. Because of this the Commission was 
asked to consider the effects of an abolition of the relevant paragraphs.  
The majority of the members of the Commission argued for the need for 
exceptions in this area. They argued without these regulations 
(hjemfallsinstituttet) future generations will not be able to uphold basic 
national control of natural resources. 
Fiscal incentives and tax breaks for FDI are currently absent from the 
Norwegian system. In terms of non-regulatory measures such as pro-active 
investment promotion and facilitation along with targeted grants, Norway 
has taken rather passive approach and these measures do not feature in the 
current policy. Like its Nordic neighbours, the country did establish a 
                                                 
34 European Communities, The structures of the Taxation systems in the EU, Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2004, 
URL: http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/resources/documents/structures_2004_final.pdf 
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government agency for the promotion of inward FDI in the 1990s. The 
Invest in Norway agency was however closed down after only a few years, 
following an internal evaluation which concluded that the results achieved 
did not match the a priori expectations nor the resources used. 
It appears that access to the Norwegian market and consequently to the 
Scandinavian and European markets - not just in a geographical context but 
also in terms of competition and free trade access - plays a very important 
role in attracting FDI to Norway. With a highly developed infrastructure and 
advanced communications, it is possible to run European scale operations 
from almost any corner of Norway and easily access markets of 
neighbouring countries. 
As a direct outcome of the country’s high quality educational system, access 
to skills and expertise ranks highly among the factors that make Norway an 
attractive location for FDI. The same goes for access to technological 
capabilities, including world-class research institutes and universities.This is 
especially a feature of high tech industries, and to the lesser extent 
traditional industries.  
In terms of cultural attitudes vis-à-vis FDI, there seems to be some variation 
between the public and political opinion. While the general public tend to 
view foreign ownership as a threat to national interests, policy makers are 
generally less categorical. The fear of loosing control over national 
resources is no doubt present, but FDI is at the same time acknowledged as 
an important source for inflows of capital, technology and competence.  
Table 8 Summary assessment for Norway 
KEY PARAMETERS 
Regulatory Environment 
Stability and transparency of the system 
Very good, stable and predictable  
Consistent rules and transparent processes 
Needs better external communication 
International legal obligations 
Important, especially EU regulation 
Vis-à-vis WTO, still in adjustment phase 
More openness is needed (e.g. agriculture) 
Fiscal incentives and tax breaks 
Insignificant, very little impact 
Taxes still perceived as high 
Better communication of tax rules is needed 
Non-regulatory Measures 
Pro-active investment promotion 
Non-existent 
Currently is irrelevant 
Better promotion through Innovation Norway 
Facilitation and/or targeted grants 
Non-existent 
Absent from central and regional development 
Better coordination is needed 
Additional Factors 
Access to markets 
Very important 
Critical to firms to enter Scandinavian market 
Better communication of opportunities 
Access to skills and expertise 
Very important 
Education system provides high quality labour 
Better liaison with firms is needed 
Access to finance Less important Conservative local financial market 
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Better communication on financial constraints 
Access to technological capabilities 
Very important 
Very good S&T capabilities 
Involvement of institutes to be encouraged 
Access to networks and clusters 
Less important 
Critical to expansion and building networks 
Better communication on clusters is needed 
Access to infrastructure 
Important 
Sometimes too costly and slow 
Further infrastructural improvements needed 
Cultural attitudes 
Important 
Government supportive, public a bit reluctant 
Better communication on benefits is needed 
Assessment for Sweden 
The Swedish economy is characterized by its openness. The country has a 
stable macroeconomic environment, and low interest rates. In April 2004, 
the Bank of Sweden lowered the discount rate to 2 per cent. This is in line 
with the level set by the European Central Bank. The Swedish corporate tax 
at 28 per cent in nominal terms is low compared to many other EU 
countries. After deductions, the tax rate is much lower. The regulatory 
environment is transparent and non-discriminatory. 
Sweden is member of the European Union but not of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU). The referendum on Sweden’s participation in 
EMU in 2003 resulted in a “no” to introducing the euro at this point. In 
substance, the economic and financial requirements for EMU membership 
are met. Sweden is also very active in the work of WTO as regards free 
trade issues.  
Over the recent period, rules and restrictions affecting inward investment 
have been liberalized. Amendments were made to the Foreign Exchange 
Control in 1989, and on the Act on foreign acquisitions of Swedish 
businesses and the Act on foreign acquisitions of real estate in 1992. The 
nationality requirement in the Companies Act for executives was also 
amended in 1992. The State employment service, the market for 
telecommunications and energy were also liberalised in the early 1990s. 
According to business surveys, an unstable regulatory environment due to 
frequent changes in regulations has for some years been of great concern for 
future investment in Sweden.35   
There are in principal no special fiscal incentives for foreign investment 
except 25 per cent tax relief on income for foreign key personnel for three 
years. According to the Invest in Sweden Agency, the criteria for getting tax 
relief has to be improved, i.e. to become easier to understand and more 
predictable. Tax on earned income is perceived as high by business leaders. 
Sweden has comprehensive tax treaties for the avoidance of double 
taxations with most countries. In 2003, Sweden introduced a new legislation 
in order to facilitate the operations of holding companies. This law provides 
                                                 
35 ITPS, NUTEK, Näringsklimatet i Sverige (The Business Climate in Sweden). Several issues. 
- 47 - 
Policy analysis  FOTON 
capital gain exemptions on the sales of long-term holdings of controlling 
shares. 
The Swedish Government gives priority to an active investment promotion 
in order to attract foreign direct investment to the country, especially those 
which could contribute to increased employment and new competence.36 
One central measure is the Invest in Sweden Agency (ISA), which is a 
government agency assisting and informing foreign investors about business 
opportunities in Sweden.37  
When it comes to additional factors affecting inward FDI, access to skills 
and technological capabilities is very important. Together with Finland, 
Sweden is ranked as the leader in European innovation. Sweden heads the 
ranking for employment in high-tech services, business R&D expenditures, 
number of high-tech patents and amount of innovation expenditures.38 The 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) ranks Sweden the top global 
nation when measuring its ability to access and use ICT.  
While the Swedish Government is supportive of inward FDI, the general 
public is a bit reluctant. In the public debate, negative aspects of foreign 
control due to acquisitions of some very big enterprise groups have 
dominated. Worries have been expressed that inward investment by 
acquisitions might lead to reductions in production and employment or to 
relocation of headquarters and other strategic functions. Recently, closures 
of some foreign controlled manufacturing plants and possible relocation to 
other EU countries supported by subsidies have been widely debated. The 
mentioned worries also concern Swedish enterprise groups, which increase 
production as well as research and development abroad. 
In conclusion, it can be mentioned that ITPS, in cooperation with Statistics 
Sweden, has interviewed about 250 enterprises based on a sample of those 
18 in each industry with most employees. The questions regarded the most 
important factors for decision on where they plan future big investments 
2003-2007.  
Stable regulation, growing market and personnel with the “right” 
competence were perceived as most important for location of big new 
investments. There were no big differences in views between foreign and 
Swedish controlled enterprises. Proximity to customers was also regarded as 
an important factor. Low taxes and level of wages were perceived less 
important. However, there were some differences in opinion in different 
industries. For example, low taxes got higher priority in the energy industry 
and low wages in business services and food industry. In other 
manufacturing industries, about a third of the interviewees regarded low 
wages as important for future investment. 
                                                 
36 The Budget bill 2003/2004. 
37 http:// www.isa.se 
38 European Commission 2004, European Innovation Scoreboard. 
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According to the business leaders interviewed, the most important 
prerequisites for greater investment in Sweden are increased demand, more 
faith in the future, reduced taxes of earned income and membership in the 
EMU. There were the same ranking of prerequisites by Swedish and foreign 
controlled enterprises in 2003. More foreign controlled than Swedish 
controlled enterprises focused on increased demand, membership in the 
EMU, and reduced wages.39 
Figure 2 What are the most important prerequisites for greater investment in 
Sweden the forthcoming 10 years? 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Increased supply of low -skilled personnel
Other factors
Don't know
Increased access to f inance
Low er interest rate
Low er tax on capital
More stable regulation
Low er corporate tax
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Membership in the EMU
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Increased faith in the future
Increased demand
Share %
Foreign enterprises Swedish enterprises
  
Source: ITPS, The Swedish Business Climate 2003.  
                                                 
39 ITPS, NUTEK, Näringsklimatet i Sverige 2003. 
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Table 9 Summary assessment for Sweden 
KEY PARAMETERS 
Regulatory Environment 
Stability and transparency of the system 
Very good transparent processes which does not 
discriminate foreign owners  
Frequent changes in legislation is not accepted by 
business leaders 
International legal obligations 
Important, especially EU regulation 
Sweden is also active in OECD and WTO 
Sweden gives priority to openness 
Fiscal incentives and tax breaks 
Insignificant, very little impact 
Taxes on earned income is perceived as high, but 
corporate taxes are very competitive 
There are tax relief for foreign key personnel 
Better communication of tax rules is needed 
Non-regulatory Measures 
Pro-active investment promotion Active investment promotion by Invest in Sweden Agency 
Facilitation and/or targeted grants 
Central and local authorities coordinate their 
activities in order to facilitate foreign investment 
Same conditions for foreign and national 
enterprises as regards public support measures 
Additional Factors 
Access to markets 
Very important factor for localisation, especially 
access to EU, Nordic and Baltic countries 
Sophisticated demand in ICT and pharmaceuticals 
is important 
A growing market is very important 
Access to skills and expertise 
Very important 
Education system provides high skilled labour at 
competitive cost 
Access to finance Regarded less important by foreign investors due to access in other countries 
Access to technological capabilities Very important Very good S&T capabilities 
Access to networks and clusters Clusters in ICT and life sciences are used in marketing of Sweden abroad 
Access to infrastructure 
Not so important according to business leaders as 
stable regulation, growing market and supply of 
high skilled personnel 
Cultural attitudes 
Important 
Government supportive, public a bit reluctant 
Better knowledge of benefits is needed 
Country rankings and values of the UNCTAD FDI 
Potential 2000-2002 
The FOTON assessment may be compared to the UNCTAD composite 
indicator for Foreign Direct Investment. The indicator is meant to give an 
indication of how attractive a country ought to be for foreign investors, 
given certain parameters. It does not try to measure actual investments. 
Please note that this indicator, like most composite indicators, has its 
weaknesses. Information may for instance be available for some indicators 
for some countries. Rankings based on it should therefore be read for what 
they are: very rough estimates.  
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Out of a list of 140 countries, all the Nordic countries are placed within the 
top 20, underlining the FOTON conclusion that the Nordic countries, in 
general, present framework conditions that are favourable to foreign direct 
investments. 
The inward FDI Potential Index is based on the 12 economic and policy 
variables listed below.40 
1 United States 0.659 
2 Norway 0.471 
3 United Kingdom 0.467 
4 Singapore 0.465 
5 Canada 0.459 
6 Belgium and Luxembourg 0.446 
7 Ireland 0.433 
8 Qatar 0.433 
9 Germany 0.432 
10 Sweden 0.427 
11 The Netherlands 0.420 
12 Hong Kong 0.413 
13 Finland 0.409 
14 France 0.396 
15 Iceland 0.394 
16 Japan 0.389 
17 United Arab Emirates 0.388 
18 Republic of Korea 0.387 
19 Denmark  0.387 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2004; www.unctad.org/fdistatistics  
 
UNCTAD explains the methodology behind the Inward FDI Potential Index 
as follows: 
“The Inward FDI Potential Index captures several factors (apart from 
market size) expected to affect an economy’s attractiveness to foreign 
investors. It is an average of the values (normalized to yield a score between 
zero, for the lowest scoring country, to one, for the highest) of 12 variables 
(no weights are attached in the absence of a priori reasons to select 
particular weights):  
 
• GDP per capita, an indicator of the sophistication and breadth of local 
demand (and of several other factors), with the expectation that higher 
income economies attract relatively more FDI geared to innovative and 
differentiated products and services.  
• The rate of GDP growth over the previous 10 years, a proxy for expected 
economic growth.  
• The share of exports in GDP, to capture openness and competitiveness.  
                                                 
40 World Investment Report 2004, pp. 15, UNCTAD, NY and Geneva 2004. 
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• As an indicator of modern information and communication 
infrastructure, the average number of telephone lines per 1,000 
inhabitants and mobile telephones per 1,000 inhabitants.  
• Commercial energy use per capita, for the availability of traditional 
infrastructure.  
• The share of R&D spending in GDP, to capture local technological 
capabilities.  
• The share of tertiary students in the population, indicating the availability 
of high-level skills.  
• Country risk, a composite indicator capturing some macroeconomic and 
other factors that affect the risk perception of investors. The variable is 
measured in such a way that high values indicate less risk.  
• The world market share in exports of natural resources, to proxy for the 
availability of resources for extractive FDI.  
• The world market share of imports of parts and components for 
automobiles and electronic products, to capture participation in the 
leading TNC integrated production systems.  
• The world market share of exports of services, to seize the importance of 
FDI in the services sector that accounts for some two thirds of world 
FDI.  
• The share of world FDI inward stock, a broad indicator of the 
attractiveness and absorptive capacity for FDI, and the investment 
climate.” 
 
Other relevant indicators 
According to many surveys companies find market size and market growth 
to be very important location factors. GDP comparisons based on 
purchasing power parities could be used to measure the relative size of 
different economies. OECD recommends using country groupings instead of 
precise ranking.  
Norway belongs to the high-income group (>120) together with Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland and United States. The other Nordic countries 
belong to the high-middle income group (100 -120) together with Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands 
and United Kingdom. Small differences in real GDP per capita are in 
general not statistically or economically significant, i.e. Sweden and Finland 
are not significantly different from each other. Country indices are based on 
OECD 30 = 100.  
The comparative price level is highest in Norway followed by Denmark, 
while the other Nordic countries have  price levels closer to the average of 
the 30 OECD countries. 
Business expenditure on research and development (BERD) as a percentage 
of GDP is an indicator used to capture the creation of formal knowledge 
within firms – i.e. it does not cover all types of innovation activities. 
Sweden is the leading OECD country followed by Finland, but all Nordic 
countries belong to the top 15 OECD countries.  
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The indicator “innovation expenditure in per cent of turnover in 
manufacturing industry” is used to measure many different activities of 
relevance for innovation. The data given below refers to 1996, but all the 
Nordic countries do probably still belong to those countries with the highest 
expenditure on innovation in the European Union. 
The indicator “expenditure on information and communication technology 
(ICT) as a percentage of GDP”, shows that Sweden and Iceland belong to 
the high-performing countries and the other Nordic countries’ expenditures 
are on the average compared to other EU countries. There is one 
disadvantage with these data  – which is given by the private source IDC – 
as there is a lack of good information on the reliability of data. It would also 
be preferable to have data on ICT investment instead of expenditure. 
Any analysis based on these indicators, should indicate that the Nordic 
Countries are attractive for foreign investment in innovative businesses. 
Table 10   A comparison of the Nordic countries by some indicators. 
Indicator  Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden 
EU 
15 
EU 
25 
Real GDP/capita 
2002 118 109 115 144 111 105 96
Comparative price 
levels 2002 118 100 111 126 106 93 90
Business R&D 
expenditure/GDP 
2003 1,8 2,5 1,8 0,86 2,92 1,28  n.a. 
Innovation 
expenditure/turnover 
in manufactruring 
1996 CIS 2 4,8 4,3 n.a. 2,7 7 3,7 n.a. 
ICT 
expenditures/GDP 
2001 7,42 6,74 9,3 5,65 9,85 6,93 8,01
     
Source: OECD and EU Commission. Real GDP/capita and comparative price level are compared to the average 
of 30 OECD countries (OECD = 100). R&D/GDP for EU 15 refers to 2001. CIS 2 for Norway refers to 1997. 
Policies targeting foreign direct investments 
It follows from the section on key policy parameters driving foreign direct 
investments, that the scale and direction of inward FDI to any given country 
is influenced by national policies in a wide range of areas, e.g. trade 
policies, labour market policies, education and research policies, etc. In 
addition to more general policies affecting the national investment climate, 
most countries nowadays have policies specifically targeting inward FDI. 
Such policies can be aimed at either restricting or attracting such 
investments. 
As pointed out earlier, FDI restrictions may include majority domestic 
ownership requirements, obligatory screening and approval procedures or 
operational controls on foreign companies such as constraints on the number 
of foreign employees or board members. Restrictions on foreign ownership 
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do exist in the Nordic countries - mainly in strategic sectors such as public 
utilities, bank and insurance, and in the case of Iceland, the fisheries. 
However, an increasing consensus over the past decades on the benefits of 
inward FDI has resulted in a generally low level of restrictions in the Nordic 
region as well as in the whole OECD area.41  
The increasing consensus on the benefits of FDI has led a wide range of 
countries to introduce policy measures aimed at attracting - and ensuring 
national benefits from - inward investments. In developing countries, policy 
measures such as export processing zones and incentives to establish 
science parks or similar facilities are used actively to attract FDI. Another 
policy measure, which is widely used in developing and developed countries 
alike, is public agencies working exclusively to attract and maintain inward 
investments. The past two decades have seen the establishment of such 
investment promotion agencies in a wide range of countries, and today more 
than 160 national and 250 regional agencies exist worldwide.42 These 
agencies are typically involved in pro-active investment promotion and in 
providing hands-on assistance to potential and actual investors. Many 
agencies operate through offices and/or representatives abroad as well as in 
their home country.  
In Europe, IDA Ireland and CzechInvest have been identified as particularly 
successful examples of investment promotion agencies.43 IDA Irland was 
established as early as in 1949 to support both domestic and foreign owned 
companies operating in Ireland, and has since 1994 been working 
exclusively on attracting FDI. In addition to the head office in Dublin and 
ten regional offices around the country, the agency have twelve offices 
abroad in order to be close to potential foreign investors. By facilitiating the 
establishment of industry-science networks, dynamic clusters and a well-
functioning infrastructure in Ireland, IDA Ireland works to attract research 
intensive and innovative businesses within sectors matching the needs of the 
national economy. The agency furthermore offers information, advice and 
networking services to potential and actual foreign investors. Foreign 
companies wishing to locate - or expand their existing operations - in 
Ireland can also apply for financial assistance in the form of various grants, 
including employment, R&D, training and capital grants.44 
CzechInvest was set up in 1992 to contribute to restructuring and growth in 
the Czech economy by attracting inward FDI. The agency, which was 
placed under the Ministry of Industry and Trade, was given the tasks of 
marketing the Czech Republic as an attractive investment destination and 
assisting potential foreign investors. In early 2004, CzechInvest was merged 
with two other public agencies into a new agency called the Business and 
Investment Development Agency CzechInvest. While the new agency is 
responsible for business development in a much broader sense than mere 
                                                 
41 OECD, OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2003/1, No 73, June 
42 http://rru.worldbank.org/Discussions/Topics/Topic33.aspx 
43 http://rru.worldbank.org/Discussions/Topics/Topic33.aspx 
44 the web pages of IDA Ireland, URL: http://www.idaireland.com/home/index.aspx 
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FDI attraction, it is still involved in a wide range of investment promotion 
activities, including the handling of investment incentives and offering 
services to investors - including aftercare services.45 
With the exception of Norway, government agencies promoting inward 
foreign direct investments currently exist in all Nordic countries. More 
detailed information on these agencies, as well as other policy measures 
aimed at attracting - and ensuring national benefits from - inward 
investments are presented below. 
Denmark 
Generally, foreign direct investments are considered as good for the Danish 
economy and the Danish government encourages foreign investments. 
Active promotion of FDI is however a fairly recent phenomenon. Invest in 
Denmark was established in 1989 as a national body promoting the country 
as a location for foreign investment in collaboration with private sector 
organisations and sub-national public bodies.46  
Invest in Denmark is part of the Danish Trade Council under the Danish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Through its ten offices, the agency actively 
provides focused marketing efforts in North America, Asia and Europe and 
gives foreign companies and potential investors a detailed insight into the 
business opportunities that Denmark offers.47 
Invest in Denmark organises its operations into three focus areas where 
Denmark has proven competitive global strengths: 
• Location Denmark focuses on attracting investments such as distribution, 
Shared Services Centres, e-business centres and regional headquarters; 
• IT/Telecom/Electronics focuses on attracting R&D centres within wireless 
communications, optics, and e-learning; and 
• Life Sciences focuses on attracting investments to Denmark’s growing cluster 
of activities within bioinformatics, proteomics, therapeutic proteins, stem cells, 
and diagnostics (Medicon Valley). 
In 2003, the main office of Invest in Denmark had a staff of approximately 
15 while the work of the nine offices abroad involved around 30 persons all 
together. The total budget was € 4 million.46 
                                                 
45 the web pages of the Business and Investment Development Agency CzechInvest, URL: 
http://www.czechinvest.org/web/pwci.nsf/home/en?OpenDocument 
46 Henrik Halkier, Ewa Helinska-Hughes & Michael Hughes, “Governing Inward Investment, Emerging 
National and Regional Patterns in West and East European Countries”, European Studies, Series of 
Occasional Papers, no. 34/2003, European Research Unit, Aalborg University 
47 www.investindk.com 
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In 2003, Invest in Denmark’s website had on average 40 000 visitors each 
month,48 and the agency participated in 36 investment projects and created 
781 jobs.49 
In addition to the national Invest in Denmark agency, there exists a set of 
regional inward investment agencies such as North Denmark Invest50 and 
Copenhagen Capacity. The latter is an investment agency for foreign 
companies that are interested in locating in the Danish capital region.51 
Copenhagen Capacity’s activities are supported by regional politicians and 
leading industrial persons from the largest companies in Copenhagen. It was 
founded in 1994 by the five regional bodies that make up the Greater 
Copenhagen Region.52 Its annual budget amounts to approximately € 3,0 
million. In 2003, Copenhagen Capacity contributed to establishing 24 new 
investments in the region, which led to almost 400 directly-created jobs and 
just over 350 indirectly-created jobs.53 
Finland 
Generally, the policy towards inward foreign direct investments in Finland 
is characterised by a non-discriminatory approach, i.e. the operating 
environment for businesses, investment conditions and public policy 
measures should be equal for both domestic and foreign owned companies. 
In practice, this is reflected in a low number of policy measures specifically 
targeting inward FDI.  
The policy focus has been on the provision of a stable societal system and a 
transparent legislative environment for businesses irrespective of 
nationality. Generic factors, such as access to infrastructure and markets, to 
skills and expertise, to networks and clusters and to technological 
capabilities are deemed to be significant preconditions for domestic and 
foreign companies alike. While the international competition for investing 
in Finnish industry gradually has become part of the political consciousness 
since the early 1990s, it has led to few policy measures.  
The Invest in Finland bureau is a national organisation promoting foreign 
direct investments in Finland.54 The organisation was founded in 1992, and 
is today judicially a foundation which is owned and funded 100 per cent by 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Until 1999 Invest in Finland was 
granted FIM 10 million (circa € 1,68 million) per year for operations.  
                                                 
48 Danmarks Eksportråd ” Danmarks Eksportråd Beretning 2003-2004”, www.eksportraadet.dk 
49 Invest in Denmark , ”You are looking at the best location in Europe... DENMARK”, 
www.investindk.com 
50 www.northdenmark.com 
51 www.copcap.dk 
52 City of Copenhagen, Frederiksberg Municipality, and the counties of Copenhagen, Frederiksborg and 
Roskilde. 
53 Copenhagen Capcity, ”Annual Report 2003”, p. 3, http://www.copcap.dk 
54 see http://www.investinfinland.fi 
- 56 - 
FOTON  Policies targeting foreign direct investments 
In 1999, the Ministry of Trade and Industry assigned a project to prepare a 
plan for the further development of the operations of the Invest in Finland 
bureau. The project recommended that the organisation’s resources should 
be increased to € 2 million. However, in the budget for 2000 the 
appropriation was cut by almost €100 000, and the annual appropriation has 
since stayed at the same level. Of the total of 190 foreign owned firms that 
were established in Finland in 2003 (117 through acquisition and 73 through 
greenfield investment), Invest in Finland was involved in around 10 per 
cent.  
In March 2004, an internal working group assigned by the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry to review the policy guidelines for foreign investments 
recommended that “the resources of the Invest in Finland Foundation will 
have to be increased” in order to bring the organisation closer to the level of 
the competitor countries in terms of resources. The working group proposed 
that the appropriation should be increased gradually between 2005 and 2008 
to approximately € 3 million. The working group also pointed out that “the 
Foundation will need a new operating strategy, which will make the 
cooperation with the current Finnish innovation organisations closer and 
clearer.” In the opinion of the working group, a contractual network model 
would serve this purpose.  
Fiscal incentives and tax breaks for FDI have not belonged to Finland’s 
policy toolbox so far. An exception is a fixed-term tax scheme for key staff 
members immigrating from abroad. In volume this scheme is however 
rather insignificant because of the strict requirements set for eligibility (the 
scheme has covered 150-200 people in average per year), and there has been 
identified a need to reform the scheme.  
In the perspective of FDI promotion, a few items in the current Finnish tax 
legislation have been identified as needing reform. According to the above-
mentioned working group “the most important measure will be to reduce the 
tax withheld at source of foreign key personnel and the capital gains tax of 
subsidiaries.” Furthermore, the working group recommends that “the tax 
obstacles to foreign fund investments should be abolished.” In line with the 
recommendation, the current Government’s programme contains a plan to 
revise the tax law so as to ensure the equality of foreign and domestic 
investors in Finnish venture capital funds. 
Iceland 
The Invest in Iceland Agency,55 founded in 1995, acts as an independent 
agency of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce promoting foreign direct 
investment to Iceland. The Agency’s advisors provide free of charge 
information and expert confidential service on all aspects of investments.  
 
The Invest in Iceland Agency functions as a “one-stop shop” for foreign 
investors. The Agency’s team provide information on investment 
opportunities in Iceland and the business environment. They arrange site 
                                                 
55 see http://www.invest.is 
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visits and plan contacts with local authorities as well as local business 
partners, professional consultants, etc.   
Iceland furthermore offers favourable tax and working conditions for 
international trading companies (ITCs), including:  
• income tax at 5 per cent; 
•  no net-worth tax; 
• no stamp duties on documents related to ITCs’ general business activities.  
An ITC can locate its business wherever it chooses in Iceland. This measure 
has not been widely used, however. 
The Ministry of Industry and Commerce has made it possible to reimburse 
up to 12 per cent of cost for making film in Iceland. As it says on the 
website of the Ministry: “Up to 12 per cent of the production costs incurred 
in the production of films and television programmes in Iceland, or, as 
appropriate, in other EEA member states, may be reimbursed by the State 
Treasury…”  
Norway 
Norway lacks an offensive policy targeting inward foreign direct 
investments. As pointed out above, the country has no fiscal incentives or 
tax breaks for FDI nor any non-regulatory measures aimed specifically at 
attracting or facilitating inward investments. Current policy makers have 
chosen a passive, indirect approach, focusing on establishing good, stable 
framework conditions for industry in general and offering a portfolio of 
business oriented policy measures to all companies with registered business 
operations in Norway, irrespective of nationality. 
There is however a tradition for more offensive policies towards FDI in 
Norway. Between 1959 and 1966, a separate government committee was 
responsible for facilitating inflows of foreign capital to Norwegian 
manufacturing industry. The background was the need for increased 
investments in the post-war economy. Under its administrative agency, the 
office for financing of manufacturing industry, Kontoret for 
industrifinansiering, the committee was active in marketing Norwegian 
manufacturing projects vis-à-vis foreign investors and offering favourable 
power contracts to companies locating production in Norway.56  
Another set of FDI related policy measures were introduced in the wake of 
the discovery of oil on the Norwegian continental shelf in 1969. While the 
building up of a national petroleum industry depended upon inflows of 
foreign capital and competence, the development of relevant national 
capabilities was a central government concern. To this end, the so-called 
technology and goodwill agreements were introduced in 1979. According to 
these agreements, foreign oil companies were to carry out parts of their 
                                                 
56 White paper no 61 (1996-1997) On industrial ownership, electronic version, URL:  
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R&D activities in Norway in return for concessions to operate on the 
Norwegian continental shelf.57  
A more recent initiative was the establishment in 1994 of the government 
agency Invest in Norway (IIN), which - like its counterparts in the other 
Nordic countries - was to promote inward foreign direct investments. The 
underlying idea was that FDI could play an important role in Norwegian 
industry, e.g. as a source for employment, technology and capital.  
IIN’s main responsibilities were to promote Norway as an attractive 
investment location, and to provide assistance to potential and actual 
investors. The agency was placed under the Norwegian Industrial and 
Regional Development Fund, SND58 and was to cooperate closely with 
other national actors representing and promoting Norway abroad, e.g. the 
foreign service missions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Norwegian Trade Council59. The life-span of the IIN agency proved to be 
short term, however. It was closed down in the late 1990s, following an 
internal evaluation which concluded that the results achieved did not match 
the a priori expectations nor the resources used.60 
Thus, while policy measures targeting foreign direct investments are absent 
in current Norwegian policies, the country has made use of such measures 
earlier on. Also, arguments in favour of reintroducing policy measures 
aimed at pro-active investment promotion have been voiced recently. In 
connection with the evaluation of the Norwegian business-oriented policy 
instrument system carried out by the Ministry of Industry and Trade in 
2002-2003, an internal working group published a report entitled Policy 
measures for tomorrow’s industry. The report maintains that it should 
belong to the tasks of the national policy instrument system to facilitate 
inward FDI by marketing Norway as an attractive investment location and 
spreading information on current regulations and investment opportunities. 
This should, according to the report, be done by establishing an “Invest in”-
agency similar to the ones that exist in other countries.61 The 
recommendation was however not followed up in the formal outcome of the 
evaluation process, the government proposition Instruments for an 
innovative and creative industry.62 
                                                 
57 NOU 2000:7 New impetus for innovation, electronic version, URL: 
http://odin.dep.no/nhd/norsk/dok/regpubl/stmeld/024005-040002/dok-bn.html 
http://odin.dep.no/nhd/norsk/dok/andre_dok/utredninger/024001-020004/dok-bn.html 
58 On January 1st 2004, SND was merged into the new innovation policy agency Innovation Norway. 
59 Like SND, the Norwegian Trade Council is today part of Innovation Norway. 
60 The information on the Invest in Norway agency is from an unpublished evaluation report developed 
by the Norwegian Industrial and Regional Development Fund, SND in 1998.  
61 Policy measures for tomorrow’s industry, report prepared by an internal project group under the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry in connection with the evaluation of the business-oriented policy 
instrument system, 2002, electronic version, URL: 
http://odin.dep.no/nhd/norsk/dok/andre_dok/rapporter/024091-990020/dok-bn.html 
62 Parliamentary bill no 51 (2002-2003) Instruments for an innovative and creative industry 
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Sweden 
The Swedish government gives priority to an active investment promotion 
in order to attract foreign direct investment to Sweden, especially those 
which could contribute to increased employment and new competence.63 
One central policy measure aimed at attracting FDI is the Invest in Sweden 
Agency (ISA) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 64 ISA is headquartered 
in Stockholm, but has operations in several countries worldwide. 
ISA has organised its activities in three focus areas: ICT and Automotive, 
Life sciences, and HUB Sweden. Besides these areas, ISA also provide 
information on business opportunities, assistance to foreign investors and 
access to its regional network in Sweden. The business covers greenfield 
investment, expansion investment, cooperation agreements and acquisitions, 
but facilitation of greenfield investment by small and medium sized 
enterprises has dominated so far. 
ISA has initiated several cooperation agreements with regional 
organisations in order to facilitate foreign investment in Sweden. The 
Swedish Government has created a working group for the purpose of 
mapping investment obstacles. ISA submits an annual report based on the 
views of foreign investors to the government. 
There are in principal no special fiscal incentives for foreign investment in 
Sweden, except 25 per cent tax relief on income for foreign key personnel 
for three years. According to the Invest in Sweden Agency, the criteria for 
getting tax relief has to be improved, i.e. they should become easier to 
understand and more predictable.  
The potential closure of production of Saab cars in Trollhättan has resulted 
in some policy measures. The Swedish government, the Left-Wing Party 
and the Environment Party have agreed on increased investments in 
infrastructure, R&D and education in order to strengthen Trollhättan and the 
South West part in Sweden as competitive locations for the production of 
vehicles. 
Discussions on foreign industrial ownership 
The topics of globalisation and foreign takeovers are discussed in all the 
Nordic countries, and the fact that many policy makers consider foreign 
investments to be beneficial does not mean that these are uncontroversial 
issues. 
Below we give a brief overview of some of the most relevant national 
discussions. 
                                                 
63 The Budget bill 2003/2004. 
64 http://www.isa.se 
- 60 - 
FOTON  Discussions on foreign industrial ownership 
Denmark 
Over the past year the discussion with regards to globalisation has focused 
on the movement of jobs from Denmark to low cost countries such as 
China, India, and more nearby countries in East-Europe as for example 
Poland. A lot of attention has been given to outsourcing of physical 
production to low-wage areas. Examples are seen of some employees 
agreeing to lower their wages in order to keep the production in Denmark. 
but after discussions with their colleagues abstained. 
Recent publications related to the internationalisation of the Danish 
economy including foreign ownership are presented below in order to 
provide an outlook of the current policy discussions in Denmark. 
The most recent bi-annual report published by the Danish Economic 
Council, Danish Economy, Autumn 2004, addresses the effects of 
international outsourcing.65 The report states that over the past decades a 
skill-biased labour demand shift has occurred in Denmark as well as in 
many other advanced economies. Their analyses do not support the 
hypothesis that job losses have been accelerating in recent years as a result 
of outsourcing.  
However, outsourcing does affect the functioning of labour markets; for 
individuals a higher level of outsourcing in a sector implies lower wages, 
and a higher level of outsourcing in a sector also implies more job 
destruction. Their calculations show that the loss of jobs due to outsourcing 
amounts to less than 5000 jobs yearly. This number of job loss should be 
compared to a total, economy wide destruction of 260 000 jobs each year. 
Accordingly, outsourcing explains only a small part of the ongoing labour 
market dynamics. New technology is probably much more significant in that 
respect. The biggest change will be the shift towards the need for more 
skilled labour. Thus, the unskilled will face the biggest pressure for 
adjustment. The report maintains that an upgrading of the qualifications of 
the labour force is decisive. 
Another report, Growth through globalisation published by the Ministry of 
Economic and Business Affairs in January 2004, describes the Danish 
Government’s strategy to take as much advantage of the opportunities 
inherent in globalisation as possible.66 According to the report, an increase 
in inward foreign investments will be conducive to national economic 
growth. Foreign companies operating in Denmark have a higher average 
productivity than Danish companies. Thus, the Government encourages 
foreign direct investments in Denmark and sees it as a means for further 
growth. A comparison of the formal barriers to incoming FDI reveals that 
the Danish formal barriers are among the lowest in the entire OECD in all 
trades and industries. Still with regards to attracting investments the report 
shows that Denmark’s performance in international competition is “only” 
average.  
                                                 
65 see  http://www.dors.dk/rapp/dors204.htm for an English summary 
66 see http://www.oem.dk/publication/growthfeb04/growth.pdf 
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The report points out some areas in which Denmark is not doing so well, 
e.g. with regards to corporate taxes. The corporate tax is higher in Denmark 
than in the other Nordic countries. Consequently, the Government has 
decided to lower the corporate tax from 30 per cent in 2004 to 28 per cent in 
2005. 
The analysis carried out in connection with the globalisation initiative also 
reveals that Denmark’s non-participation in the euro influences the 
integration with other countries’ financial markets. If the level of the 
financial interaction of the euro countries were transferred to Denmark, the 
total cross-border financial transactions to and from Denmark would 
increase by 20-30 per cent compared with the current situation, according to 
the study. Thus, the Government would - when the time is ripe and after a 
referendum - like to see Denmark’s full participation in the European 
cooperation. 
Finland 
Over the past year the discussion on the impacts of economic globalisation 
has flourished in Finland. In this context attention has also been paid to 
issues of national and foreign ownership. Many organisations have 
contributed to the public discussion by publishing a wide range of reports 
concerning this particular issue. The concern for Finland’s competitiveness 
has functioned as an impetus in the discussion. It is argued that in the 
pressure of global competition, companies are increasingly comparing 
location bound advantages and weaknesses for business. This means that 
companies also consider moving production and other operations to more 
competitive countries and/or growing markets as a strategic decision.  
The so-called “China phenomenon” has been one of the most widely 
debated topics in the Finnish media recently. This discussion has been 
fuelled by some companies’ decisions to move part of their operations 
abroad and in some cases also to China. These decisions and the public 
debate on the impacts of globalisation have caused concern and demands to 
clarify Finland’s position and strategy in the global economy.  
It is a widely held opinion, that in order to sustain its position in 
international competition Finland has to invest further in knowledge and 
innovation based development and firms’ operational preconditions. 
Globalisation is not seen simply as a threat but also as an opportunity 
provided that Finland manages to stay an attractive location for business. 
This has led to increased demand for studies concerning foreign direct 
investment and foreign ownership at large. In the following, a few essential 
reports are mentioned to provide an outlook on the level of policy 
discussion in Finland.  
In September 2003, the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers 
published a report of Finland’s attractiveness as a location for production 
and headquarters. According to the report, increasing Finland’s 
attractiveness would demand lowering taxation of earned income and 
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especially lowering taxation of experts. Other issues raised were increasing 
the levels of R&D and education.67  
In the beginning of 2004, the Finnish Prime Minister’s Office set up a 
committee to investigate Finland’s position in global economy. The final 
report was submitted to Finland’s Prime Minister on November 9th the same 
year. A wide range of background publications were produced in this 
particular project. According to the report, the share of foreign investment to 
Finland in proportion to GNP has been relatively small and is well below 
the EU average. It is maintained that especially new and growing 
entrepreneurship should be allured to Finland.  
Over the past years, the country has seen few examples of these so called 
greenfield investments. Foreign investment has largely taken the form of 
acquisitions. Three proposals are presented in the publication. Firstly, in 
order to attract more foreign investment Finland should tighten the 
cooperation with various actors in this field, e.g. with the Invest in Finland 
agency and Finpro. Finpro is an association for assisting Finnish companies 
in internationalisation. Another proposal is to create a common strategy for 
various operators for attracting new foreign investment. Thirdly, the final 
report proposes a government bill in order to change the taxation of foreign 
investors. This is to say that profits should be taxed in the investor’s home 
country.68 
As mentioned above, the committee assigned by the Prime Minister’s office 
commissioned several background papers which assess Finland’s position in 
global competition and factors affecting companies’ decision of location. 
The Prime Minister’s Office published altogether six background reports 
and a report on the sector-specific dialogue between the employers’ and 
employees’ organizations.  
The research institutes involved in the preparation of the background studies 
have also published a number of reports in their own publication series.69 
For instance the Research Institute of Finnish Economy, ETLA published in 
September 2004 the report Finland in Global Competition - Determinants of 
Firms’ Locational Decisions. According to the report, Finland’s strengths 
can be found in society’s functionality and stability, people’s 
trustworthiness and honesty as well as technological competence. On the 
other hand, personal taxation and labour costs were seen as most important 
weaknesses.70 
Concrete recommendations to increase Finland’s attractiveness as an 
investment destination were outlined by an internal working group set by 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry in the winter of 2003-2004. The aim was 
to investigate means to increase foreign investment. International 
                                                 
67 see http://www.tt.fi/arkisto/getoriginal.pl?ft_cid=4173 (publication in Finnish only)  
68 for more information, see http://www.vnk.fi/tiedostot/pdf/fi/89904.pdf (publication in Finnish only) 
69 Publication list is available at http://www.suomimaailmantaloudessa.fi/?m=5, so far only in Finnish 
even though there are also few reports in English. 
70 for more information, see http://www.etla.fi/files/1080_Dp927.pdf (publication in Finnish only) 
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comparative studies show that Finland invests less in promotion activities 
than other EU countries. In March 2004, the working group published a 
document entitled Policy Guidelines for Foreign Investments, according to 
which foreign investments in Finland are: 
“necessary for balancing the development of internationalisation and for 
maintaining international competitiveness. Promotion of the growth of foreign 
investments in strategically important sectors will have to be made an 
increasingly integral part of business environment policy.” 
 
The working group’s report furthermore defines two related goals of 
business environment policies in Finland: “improvement of the general 
attractiveness of the operating environment and harmonisation of the 
investment conditions between domestic and foreign enterprises.” In order 
to reach these goals, “development of the functioning of the innovation 
environment and of Finland’s technological strengths, as well as removal of 
the obstacles to foreign investments without distorting competition” is 
required.  
The report also includes comparative analyses of promoting activities in a 
few other EU countries (Denmark, Sweden, Ireland). Furthermore, means of 
public authorities for promoting foreign investment are discussed and 
Finnish actors promoting foreign investment are presented. Proposals for 
actions are categorised according to four themes: Industrial political actions, 
development of the Invest in Finland agency, removing legislative barriers 
and public enterprise financing and taxation.71  
Finnish stakeholder organisations and the media have also been active in the 
lively discussion on foreign direct investment. Many articles published in 
Finnish newspapers and business papers have related to the previously 
introduced publications. One article concerning foreign investment in the 
leading Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat in September 2004 
introduced UNCTAD’s recent report on the international level of foreign 
investment. In this comparison Finland was not seen attractive for foreign 
investors. In another article in the paper called Tekniikka&Talous in 
September 2004, Finland’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Development 
raised her concern about Finland’s low level of foreign investment.  
The issue was approached from a somewhat different angle by the chairman 
of the newly established Confederation of Finnish Industries (EK) in the 
business newspaper Kauppalehti in late November 2004. The chairman of 
EK demanded a better business environment for companies, which is a 
guarantee also for the Finnish welfare society. According to him, the 
Government’s decision to reform company and capital income taxation does 
not, however, support domestic ownership.  
In late 2003 the Government presented a plan for reforming the Finnish tax 
system with the aim of reinforcing its international competitive position. 
This should in turn promote companies’ investment, growth and their 
capacity to generate employment. A main element in the reform is a 
                                                 
71  for more information, see http://ktm.elinar.fi/ktm_jur (publication in Finnish only) 
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reduction of the corporate income tax rate by 3 percentage units to 26 per 
cent, as well as reduction of the capital tax rate by 1 percentage unit to 28 
per cent. Besides changes in the tax rates, the Government has introduced a 
more profound reform of company and capital income taxation including 
taxation of dividends. Overall, the Government’s plan to reform company 
taxation has been welcomed in the public debate. However, the reform plan 
for capital income taxation and particularly the proposed model for (partial) 
taxation of dividends has raised criticism not only among the political 
opposition but also from industry and business stakeholders. 
Iceland 
There has been increase in both the stock and flow of FDI in Iceland in 
recent years. Acquisitions of Icelandic companies are not as frequent as 
greenfield investments. Recent examples of inward FDI are the large 
investment in an energy plant in the highland north of Vatnajökull and in a 
foreseen aluminium plant in East Iceland. It is however the outward FDI 
that is most noticeable for Icelanders. The stock of outward FDI was about 
ISK 120 billion in 2003 and the activity in 2004 has increased this stock 
considerably. Examples of outward FDI in 2004 are the large investment of 
the Baugur Group in the UK, investments of banks in the Nordic countries 
and even investments by Icelandic airline companies in Europe, to mention 
a few.  
Icelanders have a generally positive attitude towards inward FDI, and 
politicians are in favour of foreign ownership since it is considered to have a 
positive effect on the economy. There are however rather strict restrictions 
on foreign ownership in some sectors of the economy, e.g. the fisheries -
which are Iceland’s main industry - and the production and distribution of 
energy. 
There are those who mean that restrictions in the country’s main industry 
limit investment in other industries. The argument is, that restrictions in one 
industry mean that investors sense that the market is not as open as they 
would prefer and turn their interest in other directions.  
Most of the discussion on foreign industrial ownership in Iceland has been 
related to the restrictions on foreign investment in the fisheries. A foreign 
company can through various holding companies and by stretching the law 
to its limits acquire 49 per cent of a fishing company. It can be noted that 
leading managers in the fisheries are beginning to open up for the possibility 
of allowing FDI. The interest organization of Icelandic fisheries (LIU) does 
however state that it should not be made easier for foreigners to buy shares 
of Icelandic fishing companies.  
Iceland may not have the advantage of a large market or even closeness to a 
large market. This means that Iceland is not very often considered a venue 
for investment in companies in production industry. Were the market is not 
the main advantage Iceland has a stronger situation. This means that when a 
supply of steady and relatively cheap renewable energy, is an advantage 
Iceland has been chosen to build up energy intensive industries. Same has 
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been the case when human resources are the main attraction. Iceland has a 
good stock of highly educated people who are capable to work in high- tech 
industries or knowledge intensive services. 
The Icelandic government has managed to make the environment for doing 
business in Iceland much better than it used to be. Framework conditions are 
in many cases better than abroad. The tax system has been made more 
transparent and the company income tax is 18 per cent. Many taxes have 
been abandoned such as property tax and various costs related to doing 
business. The interest rate is lower than it has been for quiet a long time but 
it is still not yet competitive in comparison with other countries.  
Norway 
Foreign industrial ownership is a controversial issue in Norway, and foreign 
takeovers of large and well-known Norwegian companies as a rule make big 
headlines in the media. The media coverage and reactions by the general 
public are typically negative, reflecting a view of foreign ownership as a 
threat to national interests.  
Among policy makers, attitudes towards foreign ownership are less one-
sided. There is on the one hand wide acknowledgement that foreign direct 
investments are an important source for inflows of capital, technology and 
competence. On the other hand, there seems to exist an inherent fear of 
losing control over national resources and thus risking an outflow of 
strategic assets. While most political parties share this dualistic view, 
opinion differs on the degree of foreign ownership that is desirable. This 
issue is seldom raised in its own right, however, but rather as an integral 
part of a broader policy discussion on what types of ownership are most 
conducive to value creation and growth in the Norwegian economy.  
Public scepticism towards foreign ownership in the Norwegian economy has 
surfaced on several occasions in the last decade. The acquisitions of the 
national chocolate manufacturer Freia by American Kraft in 1993, the 
pharmaceutical company Nycomed by British Amersham in 1997 and - 
most recently - the Ringnes breweries by Danish Carlsberg in the spring of 
2004 were all met with negative reactions in the media. In all cases, loss of 
national control was argued to pose a threat to national employment and 
value creation. Just as much as socio-economic considerations, however, the 
negative reactions seem to have been rooted in patriotic sentiments. With 
reference to a well-known marketing slogan for the company’s milk 
chocolate, the sale of Freia was referred to as a loss of “a small piece of 
Norway”, and with Carlsberg’s takeover of Ringnes the country was said to 
suffer a “sad cultural loss.”72 
Differences in political attitudes towards foreign ownership in Norway can 
be illustrated by comparing the three white papers on industrial ownership 
                                                 
72 Article entitled “Norge selges bit for bit”, published on the webpages of Dagens Næringsliv 13.09.04, 
URL: http://www.dn.no/forsiden/naringsliv/article325728.ece; Article entitled “Ringnes-salg et sørgelig 
kulturtap”  published on the web pages of Aftenposten 20.02.04, URL: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/okonomi/article736292.ece 
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that have been published over the last six year period. The white papers 
were published by three different governments, positioned at the left, centre 
and centre-right of Norwegian politics respectively.  
In 1997, the Labour government in power published a white paper entitled 
On industrial ownership. The white paper states that one of the main 
principles in the government’s strategy for industrial ownership is “to secure 
a balanced ownership structure in which a substantial national ownership is 
maintained [author’s italics].”73 While it is acknowledged that Norway 
should attract technology, competence and capital through foreign 
investments, emphasis is placed on the need to strengthen national 
ownership. National ownership is implicitly seen as a precondition for 
keeping strategic business activities in Norway, as well as for securing 
national employment and value creation more generally. The arguments in 
favour of national ownership furthermore serve as arguments in favour of 
state ownership, which - in an increasingly globalising economy - is seen as 
an important measure to secure national ownership in the long term.74  
In the autumn of 1997, the Labour government was replaced by a coalition 
government made up of three smaller parties holding a centre position in 
Norwegian politics.75 The new government published a white paper entitled 
Industrial ownership in 1998. While the document to a large extent builds 
upon the Labour government’s white paper, a departure from the strong 
emphasis on national ownership is evident. Overriding goals in the centre 
government’s ownership strategy are held to be “to contribute to a balanced, 
distributed and varied ownership” and “to stimulate active, private 
ownership.” The role of the State is reduced from being a guarantor of a 
strong national ownership to securing public ownership in business areas 
that manage important national natural resources.76  
The toning down of the importance of national ownership in the centre 
government’s white paper does not mean that the value of having nationally 
owned firms is not acknowledged. The white paper maintains that national 
ownership can have positive spill-over effects on value creation in industry 
and in society at large, and that Norwegian owners can be assumed to be of 
significance for keeping strategic business activities such as management 
and R&D localized in Norway. However, it is emphasized that the 
competence of industrial owners often is a more important than their 
nationality, and that the country needs an ownership structure in which 
“both Norwegians and foreigners are represented in the capacity of their 
competence.”77 
The next - and latest - white paper on industrial ownership to be published 
in Norway, came in 2002 on the initiative of the centre-right government 
                                                 
73 White paper no 61 (1996-1997) On industrial ownership 
74 White paper no 61 (1996-1997) On industrial ownership 
75 the Christian People’s Party (KrF), the Liberal Party (V) and the Centre Party (SP) 
76 White paper no 40 (1997-1998) Industrial ownership 
77 White paper no 40 (1997-1998) Industrial ownership 
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currently in power. In this government, the Conservative party holds the 
majority. While the white paper primarily focuses on state ownership, it 
reflects the government’s view on industrial ownership more generally. 
According to the document, the government believes that “a wide variety, 
combinations of owners and different kinds of ownership create a good 
environment for high value creation through an active market for 
ownership.”78 The need for active ownership is emphasised, and - based on 
the view that the State is a passive owner, the white paper argues in favour 
of reducing state ownership to strategic sectors.  
As in the two previous white papers, the value of national ownership is 
acknowledged. It is maintained that “for Norwegian industry, it is important 
that many both small and large businesses have a clear Norwegian 
anchoring and are managed from Norway.” However, emphasis is placed on 
strengthening private ownership rather than national ownership, and the 
white paper explicitly states that “it must […] be attractive for foreign 
investors to invest in Norway.”79 
To sum up: Whereas the general public in Norway tend to be sceptical 
towards foreign industrial ownership, the positive effects of inward FDI are 
widely acknowledged among policy makers. The degree of openness 
towards foreign ownership does however vary between political parties. As 
the three latest Norwegian white papers on industrial ownership show, this 
seem to follow indirectly from broader views on what kind of ownership is 
most conducive to national value creation and welfare. In advocating 
national and public ownership, the Labour party is less open to foreign 
ownership than parties positioned further to the centre-right in Norwegian 
politics who generally emphasise the importance of private ownership. 
Sweden 
In the public debate in Sweden, negative aspects of foreign control due to 
acquisitions of some very big enterprise groups have been given attention. 
Worries have been expressed that inward investment taking the form of 
acquisitions might lead to reductions in production and employment or to 
relocation of headquarters and other strategic functions. Some examples of 
closures of foreign controlled manufacturing plants and possible relocation 
to other EU countries supported by subsidies have been widely debated. The 
mentioned worries also concern Swedish enterprise groups, which increase 
production as well as research and development abroad.  
In 2004, most attention in the media was given to General Motors’ potential 
closure of car production in Sweden or Germany due to unprofitable 
business in Europe. In addition the potential closure of a factory belonging 
to the Swedish enterprise group Electrolux got a lot of attention in 2004. 
Electrolux made a feasibility study on advantages and disadvantages to 
relocate production of vacuum cleaners from Sweden to its factory in 
Hungary. This resulted in a decision to move the production to Hungary. 
                                                 
78 White paper no 22 (2001-2002) A reduced and improved state ownership 
79 White paper no 22 (2001-2002) A reduced and improved state ownership 
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Electrolux was a dominating employer in the municipality Västervik in 
Sweden, which caused at lot of worries on how to secure employment at the 
local level. 
The merger between Astra and Zeneca in 1999 also raised a great amount of 
public discussion in Sweden. In a number of articles the issue was covered 
as if Astra’s shareholders had lost out in the merger. In the Swedish press, 
the decision to locate the headquarters in London was seen as a visible sign 
of Swedish interests losing out in the merger.  
At the time of the AstraZeneca merger, there was a wider debate in Sweden 
triggered by the relocation of a number of large headquarters from Sweden 
to other countries. The main motive according to surveys by ITPS was the 
increase in foreign takeovers.80 In 2003, the share of headquarters abroad 
amounted to 37 per cent of about 200 interviewed businesses. There were no 
significant correlation between location of headquarters and changes in 
R&D investment. In this context, it can be mentioned that the main 
responsibility for the research and development operations of AstraZeneca 
has also after the merger been located in Södertälje, Sweden.  
In a radio programme sent in July 2004, the Swedish pharmaceutical 
industry in general and AstraZeneca in particular was discussed by different 
actors.81 The discussion originated from a statement made by AstraZeneca, 
saying that they might reduce some activities in Sweden and carry out future 
clinical studies abroad. The background was that the county councils have 
recommended doctors to prescribe cheaper medicine copies instead of the 
more expensive originals, and that the rules regarding contact between 
doctors and the industry should be more restrictive. In Sweden, the 
pharmacies have also been recommended to exchange more expensive 
pharmaceuticals with less expensive ones. These conditions in combination 
with less respect for patents, might lead to less incentives for the 
pharmaceutical industry to invest in new research. This is not a policy issue 
for Sweden only, but probably for most countries in the European Union. 
Outsourcing of services to “low-cost” countries, especially to India has been 
widely debated in the US. In Sweden, the debate has covered relocation of 
headquarters and production, but in 2004 relocation of services also got a lot 
of attention. For example, call centers, ICT consultancy and some computer 
based administrative functions have been relocated from Sweden to Eastern 
Europe and India. According to the former Swedish Minister of Industry, 
Leif Pagrotsky, Sweden cannot compete in simple low-cost production. 
Foreign investors probably find Sweden most attractive in international 
competitive areas such as R&D intensive businesses. He also maintains that 
Sweden, although the country has a high degree of inward foreign 
investment, must continue to attract foreign businesses. 
                                                 
80 ITPS, NUTEK 2003, Näringsklimatet i Sverige 2003 (The business climate in Sweden 2003 
publication in Swedish). 
ITPS 2003, Flytt av huvudkontor, tänkbara orsaker (Relocation of head quarters, possible motives 
publication in Swedish). 
81 Radio program called Studio Ett, 20th of July, 2004. 
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Increased competition is another aspect of FDI that has been debated in 
Sweden recently. The Swedish trade union for construction workers has 
initiated a blockade of a Latvian company due to the payment of low wages 
(about half of Swedish wages) for immigrant workers. This resulted in a 
debate in the Swedish parliament on the Collective Agreements Act. The 
Latvian company Laval un Partneri has asked the Swedish Labour Court to 
try this case. The question regards the right for Swedish trade unions to 
demand foreign companies to sign Swedish collective agreements instead of 
the ones from other EU countries as well as the possibility to demand higher 
wages for immigrant workers. 
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Globalisation of companies 
Globalisation is mainly an expression for new and more complex 
relationships between trade and direct investment as well as an increased 
dependence between performance of businesses within an enterprise group 
and localization in different countries. Today the focus on globalisation 
often relates to the upward trend in direct investment.  
The acceleration of mergers and acquisitions in the US and European Union 
is the principal motive behind this trend. The former task force of 
Globalisation Reflection Group at Eurostat used the following concept of 
globalisation: The existence of interactions between enterprises residing in 
different countries, which are related by other links than mere market, trade 
and their socioeconomic consequences. 
Definition of domestic multinational, foreign controlled and uninational 
enterprises  
Domestic multinational enterprises are nationally controlled enterprises with at 
least one subsidiary abroad. Foreign controlled enterprises are those with 
subsidiaries or branch offices in host countries. Enterprises controlled by a 
foreign owner, with more than 50 per cent of the voting shares, are regarded as 
foreign controlled. An enterprise controlled by two or more owners with voting 
rights totalling to more than fifty per cent and with different country of origin, is 
since the reference year 2001 in Swedish statistics assigned to a special 
category, split control.  
 
Enterprises which have not been defined as foreign controlled are regarded as 
domestic controlled enterprises.  
 
Uninational enterprises are domestic controlled enterprises which do not have 
any subsidiaries abroad.  
 
Proxy for domestic multinational, foreign controlled and uninational 
enterprises 
In the main  statistical analysis of FOTON, which is based on the Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS 3), proxies have to be used in order to identify domestic 
multinational, foreign controlled and uninational enterprises. Domestic 
multinational enterprises are those which report innovation collaboration within 
the enterprise group but outside the home country. Foreign controlled are those 
enterprise groups with head quarters outside the host country. Domestic 
enterprise groups which have no collaboration outside the home country have 
been defined as uninational enterprise groups. 
 
Increased direct investment is in many ways associated with cross-border 
sales and the need for a physical presence. For products that need to be  
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adapted locally, being located near the customer is critical. Many types of 
services can only be sold in other countries through direct investment, that 
is, local presence. For manufacturing companies, direct investment is often a 
result of trade. Direct investment can also come about because of ownership 
advantages, i.e. internalising operations.  
The wave of acquisitions in 1990’s and 2000’s is different from that in the 
1980’s. The deregulation of capital markets has made it easier for 
companies to expand globally. Now several driving forces for global 
expansion have become more important. Company strategies, for instance, 
have become an increasingly important factor. They are often focused on 
becoming bigger and bigger to face growing international competition and 
to manage increasing research and development costs.  Many feel a need to 
concentrate resources on their company’s core competencies.  
Companies are also streamlining operations by reviewing the efficiency of 
their global activities. This also results in increased competition in global 
enterprise groups. Deregulation in telecommunication as well as in the 
financial and energy sectors has also helped to increase direct investment. 
Insufficient statistics 
Many might believe that it would be easy to find data presenting the extent 
of foreign takeovers in the five Nordic countries. But there are big future 
challenges for statistical providers: data should be more up to date and have 
a better coverage of valuables and countries. Statistics and, especially, 
international harmonised data on globalisation are lagging behind and are 
only available for a few countries. The European Commission is preparing a 
regulation on Community statistics on the structure and activity of foreign 
affiliates (FATS), which should commence in 2005, which is  too late for 
the purpose of this study. 
At the beginning of 2004, the latest data published on foreign affiliates in 
the EU82 covered nine countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United 
Kingdom) for the reference year 2000. Yet, dramatic changes have occurred 
in the structure of cross-border ownership since 2000. Rapid changes in 
merger and acquisitions, which might have a big impact on growth and 
employment has led to cross-border restructuring of businesses. For 
example, the recent downturn in the ICT sector cannot be covered by 
existing statistics. According to data for 2000, the ICT sector in Sweden 
contributed more than other sectors to growth in the business sector.  
The first aim is to analyse the extent of foreign takeovers and the 
development of this kind of cross-border activities over time for all Nordic 
countries. The second aim is to analyse the distribution of takeovers by 
country of origin and industry. The third aim is to show their contribution to 
productivity and intensity in research and development.  
                                                 
82 Statistics in focus, Theme 4 – 21/2004. 
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(note that the header in this section is inconsistent with the previous 
ones)Unfortunately, only Sweden can provide most needed statistics in this 
area. In order to manage this survey on foreign takeovers we have to do our 
best by using existing data. A private source, Thomson Financial 
Corporation, has been used in order to show the extent of merger and 
acquisitions in all the Nordic countries. These data are based on different 
public sources and the coverage is probably best for big enterprises. Further, 
the value of acquisitions is in many cases not available. There are also data 
on Iceland in this source, but the value is too small to be presented in the 
figures.  
Some data on foreign controlled enterprises from Eurostat has been used for 
Denmark. Other sources are Statistics Finland and Swedish Institute for 
Growth Policy Studies. The OECD, in combination with data from Statistics 
Norway, is the source for information on foreign controlled enterprises in 
Norway. Iceland does not produce any statistics on the activity of foreign 
controlled enterprises. 
However, there are other kinds of statistics available for all Nordic 
countries, i.e. statistics on foreign direct investment within the framework of 
balance of payment statistics. These statistics are produced by central banks 
and is used to measure financial cross-border flows, and inward and 
outward flows of capital as a part of a country’s balance of payment. 
However, they cannot be used to measure the extent of foreign investment. 
For example: the financing of investments in the host country is not 
included.  
Indicators on globalisation 
In Sweden some simple indicators are used to measure the extent of 
globalisation. The main indicators are based on the number of employees. 
Inward foreign direct investment is measured as the number of employees 
and as a share of the business sector.  
For outward foreign direct investment a special indicator is used to showing 
the degree of internationalisation, i.e. the share of employment abroad of all 
employed in Swedish international enterprise groups. R&D intensity is 
measured as number of R&D person years as a percentage of all employees 
in international enterprises. 
Big acquisitions in Sweden compared to other OECD 
countries 
Sweden had the second highest value of foreign acquisitions during 1996 to 
2002 compared to several other OECD countries. Luxemburg had the 
highest value of acquisitions. United Kingdom and the Netherlands also had 
a share of GDP over five per cent. There were no big differences in value 
between Finland, Norway and Denmark, between 2-3 per cent.  
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In order to compare the extent of foreign acquisitions in relation to the size 
of the countries, the average value in current prices has been related to GDP. 
Figure 3 The value of Inward Merger and Acquisitions in per cent of GDP, 1996-
2002. 
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Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report based on data from Thomson Financial Corporation and compiled 
by ITPS. OECD is the source for GDP. 
The only possible way of covering mergers and acquisitions for all Nordic 
countries is to use a private source: Thomson Financial Corporation.  
According to the value of inward merger and acquisitions in current prices 
for the period 1996-2002, there seems to be a common pattern in all Nordic 
countries except Iceland. There was a peak in takeovers in the period 1999 
to 2000, which probably is influenced by the financial markets. The value of 
takeovers in Sweden reached a unique high level in 1999, which mainly can 
be explained by two very big acquisitions (AstraZeneca and Volvo Cars).  
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Figure 4 The value of inward merger & acquisitions in the Nordic countries, 1996-
2002. Current prices in  MUSD. 
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Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report based on data from Thomson Financial Corporation and compiled 
by ITPS. Note:M&A in Iceland amounted to 4 MUSD in 1996 and 229 MUSD in 2002. 
Services dominate international merger and acquisitions 
Since 1995 enterprises in the service sector account for an increasing share 
of worldwide acquisitions. Between 1987 and 1994 manufacturing 
enterprises accounted for the highest share. In 2001 financial enterprises 
accounted for the highest value of acquisitions, followed by enterprises in 
transports and communications as well as business services.83 
Table 11 Value of worldwide inward merger & acquisitions by industry, MUSD. 
Industry 2001 1994 
Financial intermediation 122 005 10 568 
Transports, 
communications 
121 490 13 540 
Business services 54 319 8 406 
Food  34 628 13 528 
Petroleum 31 167 4 216 
Mining  27 964 4 568 
Trade 27 668 8 753 
Chemicals 26 462 20 061 
Electronics 25 732 3 432 
Electricity, heating, water  21 047 2 510 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report based on data from Thomson Financial Corporation compiled by 
ITPS. Current prices. 
                                                 
83 UNCTAD, WIR 2002. 
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Mode of entry in Sweden 
Sweden is the only Nordic country that makes regular surveys of mode of 
entry84 within the framework of official statistics. Since the reference year 
1997 a question on mode of entry is part of the annual survey on foreign 
controlled enterprises. The questionnaire is available at  
www.itps.se/in_english/statistics/Questionnaire.xls
Acquisitions including mergers have dominated as the main mode of entry. 
Among the biggest foreign controlled enterprise groups there are only a few 
examples of greenfield investment (i.e. meaning the establishment of new 
units) and these were by the end of the 1900 century and some in the early 
1990’s. 
According to ITPS statistics there was a peak in four modes of entry in 
Sweden during the period 1999 to 2000, i.e. in the number of acquisitions, 
mergers, joint ventures and greenfield investment (Table 12). Sweden has 
probably had the highest number as well as the highest value of foreign 
acquisitions compared to other Nordic countries, but it seems like all 
countries except Iceland had a peak in the value of foreign acquisitions 
during 1999 to 2000. 
Table 12 Number of foreign controlled enterprises by year of entry and mode of 
entry into Sweden.   
 
Year Acquisition Merger 
Joint 
venture Greenfield Other 
No 
answer Total 
<1990 362 19 17 480 6 58 942 
1990-
1991 163 7 3 93 4 14 284 
1992-
1993 196  2 151 2 16 367 
1994-
1995 349 21  142 2 26 540 
1996-
1997 501 14 6 218 6 36 781 
1998-
1999 997 83 6 383 10 58 1537 
2000-
2001 1283 49 13 470 26 49 1890 
2002-
2003 649 13 3 173 18 21 877 
        
No 
answer 134 3 3 117 3 1966 2226 
Grand 
Total 4634 209 53 2227 77 2244 9444 
Source: ITPS, International Business. Note: No answer in the column refers to year of entry and includes the 
answer don’t know. No answer in the row refers to mode of entry. 
                                                 
84 Helsinki School of Economics has a database, which include data on merger & acquisitions, but due to 
confidentiality it is only available for researchers at this school and could not be used in this project. 
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Increased number of employees in foreign controlled 
enterprises  
The Nordic countries have experienced a large increase in inward foreign 
direct investment since mid 1990’s.  
At the end of 2003 was recorded the highest level of foreign control in 
Sweden ever. There were about 10 000 foreign controlled enterprises with 
564 200 employees in Sweden. This corresponds to 23 per cent of the total 
employment in Swedish business sector. 
 
Figure 5 Number of employees in foreign controlled enterprises and their share of 
total employment in the business sector in Sweden 1990-2003. 
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Source: ITPS, International Business. 
In 2003, 316 000 persons in Sweden were employed in enterprises 
controlled by EU-countries, 156 000 in enterprises from the Nordic 
countries and 106 000 persons in enterprises from the US. The number of 
employees increased most in enterprises controlled by the Nordic countries 
between 2002 and 2003. 
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Figure 6 Number of employees in foreign controlled enterprises in Sweden by 
country of origin 2003 and 2002. 
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Source: ITPS, international Business. 
The number of employees in foreign controlled enterprises has also 
increased in Finland from mid 1990’s. Finland had the highest level of 
foreign control in 2002 measured as number of employees. There were 
2 100 foreign controlled enterprises with 185 200 employees in 2002. This 
corresponds to about 14 per cent of the total employment in the Finnish 
business sector. The share of turnover was higher, i.e. almost 18 per cent.  
The higher share in employment in comparison with turnover in foreign 
controlled enterprises is a familiar pattern found other EU-countries which 
delivers statistics on foreign affiliates to Eurostat.  
Foreign controlled enterprises’ share of number of employees in 
manufacturing was above average for the whole business sector, i.e. almost 
18 per cent. 
Figure 7 Number of employees in foreign controlled manufacturing enterprises in 
Finland 1995-2002. 
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Source: Statistics Finland. 
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Sweden dominated as investor in Finland 2002 and 2001, measured as 
number of employees. The US was the second biggest country of origin 
followed by Denmark, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Norway also 
belonged to the 10 biggest investors in Finland. 
Figure 8 Number of employees in foreign controlled enterprises in Finland by 
country of origin 2002 and 2001. 
 
Source: Statistics Finland 
The number of employees also increased in foreign controlled enterprises in 
Norway, but not as much as in Sweden and Finland. 
 
Figure 9 Number of employees in foreign controlled manufacturing enterprises in 
Norway. 
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Source: OECD. 
The three largest countries in direct control (immediate control, not country 
of origin) as regards number of employees in Norway are: Sweden, 
Denmark and the Netherlands.  
The high ranking of the Netherlands may be due to holding companies 
located in that country while the ultimate control is held by companies in 
other unknown countries. According to a survey by Eurostat, the difference 
between immediate and ultimate control gives an overestimation of the 
Netherlands and underestimation of the US as countries of origin. 
In Denmark foreign controlled enterprises’ share of employment in the 
business sector was about 7 per cent in 199985. Their share of turnover was 
11 per cent. 
Figure 10 Top five controlling countries in Denmark by share of value added in the 
business sector 1999 (%). 
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Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Theme 4, 3/2003. Increased global presence 
According to Swedish statistics, enterprises in services as well as small and 
medium sized enterprises have increased their global presence in the 1990’s 
and early 2000’s. More than half of all employees in foreign controlled 
enterprises in Sweden, totalling 298 000, were employed in service 
industries, predominately in business services and wholesale trade in 2003. 
About 235 000 were employed in the manufacturing industry, 
predominately in manufacturing of vehicles and chemicals.  
In the pharmaceutical industry, which is the dominating part of the chemical 
industry, 88 per cent were employed in foreign controlled enterprises. In the 
ICT sector 231 000 were employed in foreign controlled enterprises in 
2003, which corresponds to 29 per cent of the total ICT sector in Sweden. 
Consultancy in systems and programming employed most persons in the 
                                                 
85 Statistics Denmark was not able to provide more updated data in time for this report. The source used 
for Denmark is Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Theme 4, 3/2003. 
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ICT sector, which corresponded to 27 per cent of all employed in the ICT 
sector in Sweden 2003. 
Figure 11 Share of foreign controlled enterprises’ employment in total industries 
in Sweden 2003. (figure in not nice, should be replaced to be more in line with the 
previous ones) 
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Source: ITPS, International Business. 
In Finland 75 000 persons were employed in foreign controlled 
manufacturing enterprise in 2002, which corresponds to 40 per cent of all 
employees in the manufacturing industry. The foreign controlled enterprises 
had more employees in the service sector, i.e. more than 85 000 persons. 
That means that about 45 per cent of all employees in the service sector 
were employed in foreign controlled enterprises, predominately in 
wholesale trade and business services. 
 
In Figure 12one can see that the highest shares of employment in foreign 
controlled enterprises in Finland were in manufacturing of transport 
equipment as well as in manufacturing of chemicals including 
pharmaceuticals, followed by manufacturing of instruments.  
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Figure 12 Share of foreign controlled enterprises’ employment in total industries 
in Finland 2002. Per cent. (This figure in not that nice either) 
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Source: Statistics Finland. 
The three largest sectors as regards employment in foreign controlled 
enterprises in Norway are: manufacturing, business services, wholesale and 
retail trade. The total number of employees in foreign controlled enterprises 
in the sectors C-K86 amounted to 243 000 persons in 2001. The financial 
industry had the highest share of employees in foreign controlled 
enterprises, almost 60 per cent. 
                                                 
86 C=Mining, D=Manufacturing, E=Electricity, gas and water supply, F=Construction, G=Wholesale and 
retail trade, H=Hotels and restaurants, I=Transports, storage and communications, J=Financial 
intermediation, K=Real estate, renting and business services. 
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Figure 13 Share of foreign controlled enterprises’ employment in total industries 
in Norway 2001. 
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Source: Statistics Norway. Preliminary data. 
In Denmark 60 per cent of the employees in foreign controlled enterprises 
were employed in the service sector 1999 and 40 per cent in the 
manufacturing industry87.  
Foreign controlled enterprises generate most value added in 
medium high-tech industries  
In Denmark, Finland and Sweden foreign controlled enterprises generate 
most value added in medium-high-tech manufacturing industries. The 
nationally controlled enterprises (domestic multinational and uninational 
enterprises) generate on average most value added in low-tech industries 
according to Eurostat’s survey in nine member states for the reference year 
2000.88 According to Eurostat this relation is not surprising, because foreign 
controlled enterprises tend to be larger and it can be seen from Statistics in 
Focus, High-tech industries in the EU89, that high-tech manufacturing is 
dominated by large companies. The share of value added generated by 
                                                 
87 Eurostat,  Statistics in Focus, Foreign-controlled enterprises in high-tech manufacturing and services. 
Theme 4, 15/2004. 
88 Eurostat,  Statistics in Focus, Foreign-controlled enterprises in high-tech manufacturing and services. 
Theme 4, 15/2004. 
89 European Communities, Theme 4-11/2003, page 4. 
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foreign controlled enterprises in high-tech manufacturing varied widely 
between participating countries, from 7,7  per cent in the Netherlands to 
35,4 per cent in Ireland. 
In Denmark and Sweden, foreign controlled enterprises generated higher 
value added in high-tech industries than nationally controlled enterprises. 
The share of value added in high-tech was 20 respectively 14 per cent. In 
Finland nationally controlled enterprises had a much higher share of value 
added in high-tech industries than foreign controlled enterprises, 25 
respectively 17 per cent..  
Table 13 Value added in the manufacturing industry by level of technological 
intensity in Denmark 2000, per cent. 
 
Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Theme 4, 15/2004. Note: Nationally controlled includes domestic controlled 
multinationals and uninational enterprises. 
Denmark High-tech Medium-
high-tech 
Medium-
low-tech 
Low-tech 
Foreign- 
controlled 
20 36.2 25.8 18.1 
Nationally- 
controlled 
13.7 20.8 20.8 44.7 
 
Table 14 Value added in the manufacturing industry by level of technological 
intensity in Finland 2000, per cent. 
Finland High-tech Medium-
high-tech 
Medium-
low-tech 
Low-tech 
Foreign- 
controlled 
16.5 46 23.2 14.2 
Nationally- 
controlled 
24.9 14.2 19.4 41.5 
Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Theme 4, 15/2004. Note: Nationally controlled includes domestic controlled 
multinationals and uninational enterprises.  
Table 15 Value added in the manufacturing industry by level of technological 
intensity in Sweden 2000, per cent. 
Sweden High-tech Medium-high-
tech 
Medium-low-
tech 
Low-tech 
Foreign-controlled 19.7 45.1 13.2 21.9 
Nationally-controlled 13.9 26.4 23.0 36.6 
Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Theme 4, 15/2004. Note: Nationally controlled includes domestic controlled 
multinationals and uninational enterprises. 
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Between 25,2 per cent in Spain and 59,1 per cent in Ireland of the services 
sector  value added  by enterprises under foreign control was generated in 
knowledge-intensive services. In nationally controlled enterprises this was 
between 22,3 per cent in France and 46,7 per cent in United Kingdom.  
As one can see in table 6, only Sweden had a higher share of value added in 
foreign controlled enterprises in knowledge-intensive services than in 
nationally controlled enterprises as regards the comparison between the 
Nordic countries. 
 
Table 16 Share of value added in service sector generated in knowledge-intensive 
services 2000, per cent. 
Country Foreign-
controlled 
Nationally 
controlled 
Denmark 28.4 45.9 
Finland 32.7 44.2 
Sweden 37.9 25.1 
Source: Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, Theme 4, 15/2004. Note: Nationally controlled includes domestic controlled 
multinationals and uninational enterprises. 
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Table 17 Definition of technological intensity 
 
Technological intensity Nace Rev.1 Industries 
High-tech manufacturing 24.4, 30, 32, 33, 35.3 Pharmaceuticals, computers, tele 
products, instruments, aircrafts 
Medium-high-tech manufacturing 24-24.4, 29, 31, 34, 35.2, 35.4, 
35.5 
Chemicals, machinery, 
electronics, vehicles, railway, 
motorcycles 
Medium-low-tech manufacturing 23,25-28, 35.1 Petroleum, rubber & plastics, 
shipyards 
Low-tech manufacturing 15-22, 36, 37 Food, textiles, leather, wood, pulp 
& paper, printing, furniture, 
recycling 
Knowledge-intensive services 61, 62, 64, 70-74 Sea transport, air transport, post 
& telecommunication, real estate, 
renting, computer processing, 
R&D, business services 
     
 
Highest productivity in foreign controlled enterprises 
According to Swedish statistics on international enterprises, i.e. domestic 
multinational enterprises with subsidiaries abroad and foreign controlled 
enterprises in Sweden, have on average a higher value added per employee 
than uninational enterprises with no subsidiaries abroad.  
Of the international enterprises, foreign controlled enterprises had the 
highest labour productivity (SEK 639 000) on average in 2002 and 2001. 
There are some differences in productivity by industries, but there is a big 
gap between international and uninational enterprises in all industries. In the 
ICT sector in Sweden the value added per employee amounted to SEK 
622 000 in foreign controlled and to SEK 529 000 in nationally controlled 
enterprises in 2002. 
 
Table 18 Enterprises’ productivity in Sweden 2002 and 2000.  
Category of enterprises 
 
Value added per 
employee, SEK 2002 
Value added per employee, 
SEK 2001 
Total business sector 541 000 521 000 
Domestic multinational 
enterprises 
595 000 555 000 
Foreign controlled 
enterprises 
639 000 618 000 
Uninational enterprises  462 000 452 000 
Source: ITPS, International Business. Note: Exclusive financial enterprises. 
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Conclusions  
Foreign takeovers have become more and more frequent in the Nordic 
countries. It seems like that the pattern of globalisation is about the same in 
the Nordic countries as in the other EU countries and in the US.   
In the European Union, Luxembourg and Ireland are very special as regards 
foreign controlled enterprises. The main reason is probably tax reliefs and 
regional incentives available for foreign controlled enterprises in these 
countries.  
Sweden followed by Finland have got most employees in foreign controlled 
enterprises compared to other Nordic countries, 564 000 (2003) respectively 
185 000 (2002) employees. In the majority of Nordic countries, the country 
of origin among the biggest investors has been another Nordic country.  
Enterprises from the US are also important investors in the Nordic countries 
as well as in the EU. 
 
Table 19 The three biggest countries of origin investing in Nordic countries by 
number of employees. 
Host country Country of origin  
1. 
Country of origin  
2. 
Country of origin  
3. 
Denmark 1999* The US The Netherlands Germany 
Finland 2002 Sweden The US Denmark 
Norway 2002 Sweden Denmark The Netherlands 
Sweden 2002 The US UK Finland 
Source: Eurostat for Denmark, Statistics Finland, Statistics Norway and ITPS for Sweden. Note: * Data for 
Denmark are based on foreign controlled enterprises’ share of value added in the business sector 1999. 
In Denmark, Finland and Sweden foreign controlled enterprises generate 
most value added in the medium-high-tech industries and nationally 
controlled enterprises in the low-tech manufacturing industries.  
The share of value added in services generated in knowledge-intensive 
services is higher in nationally controlled enterprises in Denmark and 
Finland, but is higher in foreign controlled enterprises compared to 
nationally controlled enterprises in Sweden. 
According to Swedish statistics, foreign controlled enterprises have higher 
productivity on average than nationally controlled enterprises. The biggest 
gap in productivity in all industries is between international and uninational 
enterprises. 
There are some controversial issues, which are difficult to cover by existent 
statistics and it is obvious that statistics have to be combined with analysis 
in order to answer complex questions.  
Some examples of complex questions: 
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• How to explain differences in productivity among foreign and 
nationally controlled enterprises? 
• How to define relocation of businesses? 
• How to measure cross-border relocation of businesses?   
• How to measure the impact on the national economy by different 
entry modes such as acquisitions and greenfield investment? 
Before it becomes possible to analyse complex questions, statistics on 
globalisation of companies will have to be improved. This can only be 
achieved by international cooperation between users and producers. There is 
a need for continuous work on harmonisation of definitions and variables. 
There is also an increasing demand among politicians to get more up to date 
international comparisons. Below are some examples on possible 
improvements of statistics, which are based on Swedish experience. 
Improvement of statistics  
There is a need to 
 Encourage more countries to provide basic harmonised data on 
globalisation such as number of employees by industry and by 
country of origin/location 
 Reduce the time-lag in producing statistics 
 Reduce the big amount of different thresholds in statistics and 
aim for better and harmonised coverage 
 Improve data on services 
 Improve data on size-classes 
 Improve data on enterprise groups 
 Combine production of statistics with analyses and encourage 
more users to participate in international meetings at Eurostat and 
OECD 
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